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Abstract
After most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legisla-
tion as a consequence of signing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPs), the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-protection
has shifted towards IPR-enforcement. This paper develops an endogenous growth
framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assump-
tions to study (a) the regions’ incentives to enforce IPR in a decentralized game,
(b) the desired IPR-enforcement of the two regions in negotiation rounds on global
harmonization and (c) the constrained-efficient enforcement level. We show how the
different solutions relate to each other and how the results depend on the research
productivity in the North and the regions’ relative market sizes. While growth rates
substantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North’s desired
level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms
of long-run welfare.
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1 Introduction
As trade of knowledge intensive goods accelerated during the last decades, patent and
copyright infringements have become a problem of highest concern. Although the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) specifies a mini-
mum set of protection standards that members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
have to assent to, the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is still a source
of great international heterogeneity and further fuels the debate about the optimal pro-
tection level of IPRs in the world.
For example, the European Commission’s IPR Enforcement Report 2009 gives account of
serious problems with IPR-enforcement in a large number of mostly developing countries.
Complaints include that injunctions or criminal sanctions are often difficult to obtain and
civil procedures are lengthy and burdensome with high uncertainty of outcomes. Involved
staff is insufficiently trained, lacks resources to effectively prosecute and convict violators,
and cooperation between authorities is insufficient. For some countries the report even
assesses a lack of political will indicated by their opposing in-depth enforcement discus-
sions in international fora such as the WTO or the WIPO.1 Studying the distributional
effects of TRIPs, McCalman (2001) argues that the agreement involves transfers from de-
veloping countries to developed countries due to stronger IPR protection. These transfers
are primarily determined by enforcement efforts rather than the extension of the coverage
of patent protection. Thus, he reasons that the developing countries “will be more will-
ing to extend the coverage of patent protection as required by TRIPs, but may be less
willing to devote adequate resources to enforcement”. Further he predicted that “future
North-South tensions over intellectual property rights are likely to be centered around
enforcement issues rather than the sectoral coverage of protection offered” (McCalman,
2001, p. 181).2
The recent debate on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) also indicates
that questions on IPR-enforcement are among the most fiercely discussed living causes.3
ACTA was worked out in secret negotiations with the aim to harmonize international
1See EU Commission (2009). A similar picture is drawn in the annual Special 301 Reports by the U.S.
Trade Representative, see Office of U.S. Trade Representative (2010). Recently, the OECD estimated the
value of counterfeited products in foreign trade in 2007 to around $ 270 billion. OECD (2009)
2Other authors hold that even though the TRIPs-Agreement provides for mechanisms of law enforce-
ment, these are not always implemented by the member countries (see e.g. Cychosz (2003)).
3In his recent book, Maskus (2012) also describes this new emphasis on IPR-enforcement.
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standards of IPR-enforcement.4 An agreement has been reached in April 2011 between
several countries among them the U.S. and the E.U.5 An ultimate objective of ACTA
is that large emerging economies, “where IPR could be improved will sign up to the
global pact” (EU Commission, 2008; Reuters, 2010).6 However, the European Parliament
has voted against ACTA on July 4, 2012, thereby opposing the European Commission,
which will now seek the legal opinion of the European Court of Justice and approach the
European Parliament to find an agreement in the future.7
Inspired by these recent developments, this paper develops an endogenous growth frame-
work to study IPR-enforcement within the context of a classical North-South trade model.
Our analysis is characterized by the following features that distinguish our paper from the
previous literature. First, we assume equal strength of enforcement of all active patents in
a region at any point in time. Second, a government cannot commit to IPR-enforcement
for the indefinite future but after each legislative term the (new) government may adjust
its enforcement efforts as it sees fit. Third, when setting its policies, the government’s
planning horizon is limited.
By the first two assumptions, we intend to capture important aspects of IPR-enforcement.
With regard to the first item, we argue that in reality IPR-enforcement depends on
whether or not a patent is active, ruling out the possibility that IPR-enforcement distin-
guishes active patents by, e.g., the year of invention.8 Second, while formal law may be
fixed for substantial time horizons, the enforcement of laws can be changed more easily,
for example, by reallocating resources used for IPR-enforcement to other purposes. Our
third assumption reflects an important aspect of policy making in that governments are
not or not only motivated by fostering long-term welfare but are concerned with their
political ends.9
4A comparison between ACTA and TRIPs can be found at e.g.
https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/ .
5The countries are: Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic
of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, and the U.S.
6In 2006, the European Union adopted the “IPR Enforcement Directive” to harmonize IPR-
enforcement levels among its members and eschew civil procedures that are “unnecessarily complicated
and costly or involve unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays” (European Parliament, 2004).
7See EU Commission (2012).
8In principle, it would be possible that enforcement distinguishes between a domestic product and an
invention of a foreign country. In this paper, we do not address this case and focus on national treatment
only.
9For example, both, politicians’ monetary and non-monetary rewards may depend on the welfare
level during their term in office. According to a large literature on the political business cycle, the
welfare during the term in office also affects the incumbent politicians’ reelection probabilities (Oudiz
and Sachs, 1985; Drazen, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). There is also a literature on office motivated
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Incorporating these assumptions into a dynamic model with endogenous innovation ar-
guably makes the analysis of IPR-enforcement more realistic. However, it is also partic-
ularly interesting as it adds another area of tension resulting from the different planning
horizons of the governments and the innovators. At the heart of our analysis is the
governments’ classical trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic gains extended by
international externalities of IPR-protection with regard to R&D incentives and profit
flows.10 By choosing IPR-enforcement, the government has to trade off welfare today -
by incurring deadweight losses and R&D costs - against future welfare resulting from a
higher technological level. Without internalizing the full future benefits of innovations,
an office-term motivated government may be more reluctant to bear the costs of great
innovative activity implying a substantial burden on current welfare.
As a consequence, we find that in the decentralized equilibrium of the IPR-enforcement
game between the North and the South, the relation between the North’s equilibrium
IPR-enforcement level and its own research productivity exhibits an inverted U-shape.
When the research capacity is low, the dynamic gains of IPR-enforcement dominate and
the enforcement level increases with a higher productivity of research. However, if the
research capacity is very high, the farsighted firms’ R&D investments and the deadweight
losses are very large reducing current consumption and welfare levels. This can lead a
short-sighted Northern government to reduce IPR-enforcement in response to an even
higher research productivity. As the South does not engage in R&D, it neglects research
expenditures but considers its influence on the R&D activity in the North. Accordingly,
the South’s equilibrium IPR-enforcement increases monotonically with the North’s inno-
vative capacity. Hence, the office-motivated government in the North possesses higher
incentives to enforce IPR than the one in the South when the North’s R&D productiv-
ity is low, while the opposite may be the case for very high levels of R&D productivity.
Further we find that a country’s relative market size positively affects its equilibrium
IPR-enforcement level. The intuition is that a larger country’s impact on R&D incentives
is relatively higher and therefore its incentive to free-ride on the other region’s IPR-efforts
are lower.
By analyzing the regions’ preferred harmonized IPR-enforcement levels at the global scale,
we seek to shed light on potential clashes of interest in international negotiation rounds.
politicians, so called populists, who pander to the public by pursuing short-term policies to maximize
reelection chances. The concern of this literature is how to give incentives to implement projects that are
beneficial in the long-term but come at costs in the short-run. See e.g., Mu¨ller (2007); Gersbach (2004).
10The trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic gains was first discussed by Nordhaus (1969).
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We compare the preferred harmonized enforcement levels with those chosen in the de-
centralized equilibrium and relate both to the constrained-efficient solution reflecting the
maximum welfare the two governments can achieve given they are not able to escape their
political-economy constraints.
Both, the North’s and the South’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement levels are higher
than their respective equilibrium choices. While the South’s preferred harmonized en-
forcement level is independent of relative market sizes, the one of the North typically
exhibits a declining relationship with its relative market size. The reason is that a larger
relative market size of the North involves relatively lower profit inflows from the South
and higher deadweight losses in the North. This contrasts with the decentralized equilib-
rium where the North’s equilibrium IPR-enforcement level is positively associated with its
relative market size. This result suggests that small innovative countries show large differ-
ences between their desired harmonized levels supported in negotiation rounds concerning
global IPR-enforcement and their own equilibrium choices.
Further, we find that relative to the constrained-efficient solution the regions’ IPR-enforce-
ment levels in the decentralized equilibrium are too low. By contrast, the North’s desired
harmonized enforcement level is typically higher than the constrained efficient one while
that of the South is lower. As a consequence, the regions’ growth rate is highest when
the harmonized IPR-enforcement level of the North is implemented. Would this rate of
growth come at the expense of welfare in the South? A numerical illustration suggests
that the South may well gain in terms of aggregate long-run welfare by adopting the
North’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement level given a sufficiently productive R&D
sector in the North. However, the opposite holds for low research capacities in the North.
The literature has approached questions regarding the international protection of IPR
from two perspectives. On the one hand, from a macroeconomic, endogenous growth
perspective which treats the regions’ IPR-enforcement as exogenous and examines its
effects on the resulting growth rate and on welfare (Helpman, 1993; Lai, 1998; Kwan
and Lai, 2003; Iwaisako et al., 2011). On the other hand, from a rather microeconomic,
industrial organization perspective that explicitly takes IPR-enforcement as endogenous,
but precludes long-run dynamics (Chin and Grossman, 1990; Deardorff, 1992; Maskus,
1990; Diwan and Rodrik, 1991; Lai and Qiu, 2003). This paper establishes a dynamic
general equilibrium framework and allows to consider endogenous choices of IPRs and
their welfare implications.
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In the next section, we relate our paper to the literature in more detail and introduce the
model in Section 3. We examine the non-cooperative game in which both regions choose
their national IPR-enforcement decentrally in Section 4. In Section 5, we analyze the
preferred harmonized enforcement levels of the North and the South. Section 6 compares
the desired harmonized enforcement levels and the decentralized equilibrium with the
constrained-efficient solution. We present implications for welfare in Section 7 and provide
a summary and conclusions in Section 8.
2 Relation to the Literature
A seminal work in the literature on international intellectual property rights protection is
Grossman and Lai (2004), which also employs a framework of variety expanding innova-
tions, but considers a one-shot game with respect to IPR-protection and does not allow
for endogenous long-run economic growth. The equilibrium in Grossman and Lai (2004)
can be interpreted as a subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium, where governments are able
(1) to decide on the IPR-protection level of each vintage of inventions separately and (2)
to fully commit to it in the future.11 Such a set-up implies the theoretical possibility that
at a particular point in time, all different vintages of active patents enjoy different levels
of IPR-enforcement. This is precluded in our model.12 Grossman and Lai (2004) find that
higher research capacity and larger market size are associated with higher IPR-protection
in the non-cooperative game. Due to limited commitment possibilities of the governments,
our model predicts a positive relation between research capacity and IPR-enforcement for
moderate research productivity levels. However, this relation may become negative for
high levels of research capacity. Moreover, our model allows to draw inferences of IPR-
enforcement on economic growth showing that even though IPR-enforcement exhibits an
inverted U-shape in the North’s research capabilities, the rate of economic growth will
strictly increase with research productivity. In contrast to Grossman and Lai (2004), we
also shed light on distributional effects associated with harmonized IPR-protection by
deriving the countries’ desired globally harmonized enforcement level. We find a negative
effect of the North’s relative market size on its preferred harmonized IPR-enforcement,
11See Grossman and Lai (2004, p. 1642).
12The major difference is that in Grossman and Lai (2004), the policy maker determines in each period
of time the level of IPR-protection only for the products invented in the same period but for the duration
of their entire lifetime (i.e. until the products become obsolete). In our model, the policy maker decides
in each period on the level of IPR-enforcement of all products under de-jure IPR-protection but cannot
commit to enforcement levels in future periods.
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but a positive effect of its relative market size on the North’s equilibrium enforcement
level. This may explain tough international negotiation rounds as particularly small inno-
vative countries advocate drastic IPR-enforcement far-off their equilibrium enforcement
levels.
Scotchmer (2004a, ch. 11) and Scotchmer (2004b) provide an elegant reduced form model
where governments decide on the length of IPR-protection. She does not derive the
value of an innovation and the deadweight losses from an equilibrium analysis but takes
them as exogenously given to focus entirely on the one-shot game of the governments
when setting the patent length. Next to the Nash-equilibrium, she also discusses the
countries’ desired harmonized IPR-protection and finds that, given equal market sizes,
the country with the higher research capacity desires higher globally harmonized IPR-
protection. Given equal productivity of R&D, the smaller country prefers a longer globally
harmonized patent length than the larger country. By contrast, our paper develops a
full-fledged general equilibrium endogenous growth model and characterizes the entire
comparative statics with respect to market size and the North’s innovative capability.
Taking a dynamic perspective and accounting for political economy constraints shows
that results may reverse if the research capabilities of the North are very strong.
Grinols and Lin (2006) is one of the few dynamic models with endogenous IPRs. Particular
to their setting is that they consider goods that are only demanded in the South but
invented in the North. In a numerical equilibrium analysis, they find that the South may
well choose a higher level of IPR-protection for this special set of products than the level
of IPR-protection chosen by the North for the remaining products which are demanded
in both regions. The driving force of this result is that the South cannot free-ride on IPR-
protection in the North to provide incentives for innovation in this particular product
category. In the decentralized equilibrium in our model, it can also occur that the South
enforces IPR more than the North if the innovative capacity of the North is sufficiently
high. However, this result originates from politico-economic reasons rather than different
demand structures in the North and the South.
The paper by Chen and Puttitanun (2005) derives the optimal level of IPR protection
in a developing country depending on the country’s relative strength of imitating and
innovating products. By varying the relative imitation capabilities, they argue that IPR-
protection in developing countries can have a U-shaped form over the course of develop-
ment, in particular IPR-protection increases when the own innovative capacities increase.
Their paper offers an alternative view on IPR-protection in developing countries by ab-
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stracting from strategic interaction with a developed country which is at the heart of our
model set-up and results.
An intriguing paper by Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa (2008) takes a complementary ap-
proach to endogenizing the strength of IPR-enforcement in an endogenous growth model
of a closed economy. Rather than being a policy instrument of the government, IPR-
enforcement is the result of private investments by firms. This leads to multiple equilibria
(one with high (low) IPR-enforcement and high (low) R&D investments) as investments
in IPR-protection and investments in R&D are complements.
Important precursors of our work within the family of endogenous growth frameworks with
exogenous IPRs are Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), and Iwaisako et al. (2011). However, in
contrast to these papers, we emphasize IPR-enforcement, which we model as a probability
that a potential competitor which has reverse-engineered the product is deterred from
illegally entering the market. Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998) assume that once a product
has been reverse-engineered, unlawful competition cannot be prevented. These papers
equate IPR-protection with the probability that the product will be imitated, while we
model IPR-enforcement as the probability of effectively preventing commercial use of the
reverse-engineered product. Helpman (1993) also considers a North-South set-up where
only the North innovates. IPRs are varied exogenously by changing the exogenously given
imitation rate. Considering both trade and FDI, the extend of the latter plays a major
role in determining the consequences of stricter IPR-protection.13 Related to Helpman
(1993), Lai (1998) considers multinational Northern firms that transfer the production of
new products via FDI to the South and shows that the effects of IPR-protection in the
South depend crucially on whether imitation or FDI by multinational firms is the channel
of international production transfer from the North to the South.14 A recent contribution
by Iwaisako et al. (2011) uses the breadth of a patent as a measure of the strength of IPR-
protection. The paper conducts a welfare analysis in a North-South endogenous growth
framework with quality improving innovations and FDI. They find that the dynamic gains
of enhanced innovations are sufficiently strong and that the South would even benefit by
adopting the IPR-standards of the North. As noted in the introduction, in contrast to
these papers, our model considers endogenous choices by governments allowing us to
13Helpman (1993) finds that stronger IPRs adversely affect the South’s welfare and could be detrimental
to the North as well, if only trade is considered.
14Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007) study technology transfer driven by imitation and Dinopoulus and
Segerstrom (2010) consider technology transfer within multinational firms via FDI. These papers confirm
Lai (1998)’s results in a semi-endogenous growth model.
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derive results on the equilibrium behavior of countries concerning IPR-enforcement and
compare it to the constrained efficient and desired harmonized solutions of the different
regions.15
Other, seminal contributions to the literature approached questions regarding the interna-
tional protection of IPRs from an industrial organization perspective. In contrast to our
paper, they typically take a partial equilibrium perspective and abstract from long-run
dynamics.16 In this branch of the literature, Lai and Qiu (2003) is most closely related
to our paper. They propose a static multi-sectoral North-South trade model, where both
regions innovate and national governments set patent length. In their partial equilibrium
analysis, they find that the countries’ equilibrium patent length increases with relative
market size. We argue that this is not always the case in a dynamic model incorporating
political economy constraints and that the effect of relative market size on the desired
harmonized IPR-enforcement of regions is typically opposite to its effect on equilibrium
IPR-enforcement.
An important assumption in our model is the link between IPR-protection and innova-
tive activity. We employ the standard view that better enforcement of IPRs leads to
higher R&D expenditures. Recent empirical support of this assumption is provided by
Branstetter et al. (2006). However there is also a literature, that doubts the positive
effect of better IPR-protection on higher research activity. For example, Sakakibara and
Branstetter (2001) find no significant effect of the Japanese patent reforms of 1988 on in-
novative activity. An excellent recent overview over empirical studies on the link between
IPR-protection and innovative activity can be found in Maskus (2012), with most stud-
ies pointing towards a positive relation between IPR-protection and innovation.17 Our
theoretical model can accommodate both cases. In our setting a country’s innovative ca-
pacity is reflected by a R&D-cost parameter. High innovative capacity implies substantial
reaction of innovative activity to a change in IPR-enforcement which would reflect the
evidence found by Branstetter et al. (2006). By contrast, low innovative capacity would
involve little additional R&D in response to higher IPR-enforcement, possibly due to
15More remotely related to our work are several interesting papers that expand this branch of the
literature by including skill accumulation (Parello, 2008), analyzing catch-up dynamics of the South
in product quality levels (Borota, 2012), and examining effects of patent policy on a country’s income
distribution in a closed economy (Kiedaisch, 2009).
16Among these papers are Chin and Grossman (1990) and Deardorff (1992), who examine welfare
effects in a North-South model with exogenous variations in IPRs, as well as Diwan and Rodrik (1991)
who analyzes IPRs endogenously chosen by the regional governments.
17An overview over older empirical evidence, also on the (mostly positive) relation between IPR-
protection and economic growth, is provided in Maskus (2000).
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costs associated with blocking patents. This would reflect the findings by Sakakibara and
Branstetter (2001). However, if innovation remains constant or is even reduced in response
to stronger IPR-enforcement, governments will choose optimally an IPR enforcement level
of zero in our framework.18
3 The Model
We consider two regions, n and s, that differ with respect to their innovative capacity.
Region n, which we also refer to as the North, produces blueprints, that are licensed out
to Region s, the South. For simplicity, we assume that there is no innovation activity in
Region s.19 Our analysis builds on a variety-expanding-growth framework where at time
t a patent is enforced with probability ωj,t in Region j = s, n. For simplicity, we assume
that imitation is costless. Thus, if the patent is not enforced in period t an imitated
intermediate good is supplied under full competition and operating profits are zero. Our
modeling strategy reflects our focus on IPR-enforcement. As mentioned in Section 2,
we emphasize the importance of prosecuting patent infringements, which contrasts with
earlier papers by Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998). They assume that once a product
has been reverse-engineered the competitor can violate laws on IPR-protection without
consequences. Taken at face value, our set-up includes the possibility that a patent is
fully protected in periods t and t + 2 but protection is not enforced in t + 1. A patent
holder may produce the same (monopolistic) quantity of the intermediate product in each
period but can only charge the monopoly price in the periods where IPR-enforcement is
perfect. In the period without enforcement of IPRs, other competitors are not effectively
deterred from offering the intermediate good as well (after reverse-engineering it), thereby
driving down prices to marginal costs. A broader interpretation is that different degrees
of IPR-enforcement constrain the degree of competition from violators of IPRs, thereby
18Typically, studies such as Ginarte and Park (1997) trying to relate IPR-protection to various char-
acteristics of countries subsume under IPR-enforcement statutory rather than de-facto protection. IPR-
enforcement in Ginarte and Park (1997) includes whether (a) preliminary injunctions, (b) contributory
infringement pleadings, and (c) burden-of-proof reversals are available. Ginarte and Park (1997) argue
that there is no big gap between statuary and actual enforcement. However, the reports by the European
Commission and the U.S. Trade Representative reveal a different picture. We are not aware of a good
measure for de-facto IPR-enforcement, which we could use to empirically test our theory.
19We do not neglect that the South conducts R&D, however, in a model where both regions innovate
but Region s possesses lower innovative capacity and without perfect knowledge spillovers between the
regions, it can be shown that the ratio between the number of innovations in Region s and Region n
tends to zero. A proof is available upon request. Moreover, in the context of our model R&D is assumed
to push out the world technological frontier, i.e. we abstract from reverse engineering and duplicative
research in developing countries.
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determining the (oligopolistic) prices that the patent-holders are able to charge. Then
the strength of IPR-enforcement ωj,t reflects the share of the monopoly profits that can
be captured in period t in country j.20
Both economies are populated by a measure Lj of households each inelastically supplying
one unit of labor in each period. There is no population growth and time moves in
discrete steps t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. We set up a dynamic model for two reasons: First, our
aim is to examine the consequences of endogenous IPR-enforcement on economic growth
and long-run welfare, which has not been done in the previous literature on endogenous
enforcement of IPRs. Second, we are interested in the effects of the mismatch of time
horizons between a politically motivated short-sighted government and innovators with
long-term planning horizons.21 In the following, we first introduce the model for given
levels of IPR-enforcement in both regions and then discuss the governments’ problems
concerning their IPR-enforcement choice.
3.1 Production
In Region j, the final good Yj is produced according to
Yj = AjL
1−α
j
∫ Nt
0
[xjt(i)]
αdi, (1)
where Aj represents a productivity measure, Lj is labor input, Nt is the measure of
different intermediates invented in the North at time t, and xjt(i) stands for the amount
of intermediate i used in final-good production in Region j = n, s in period t. The
elasticity of substitution between the different intermediates is determined by α ∈ (0, 1).
Each intermediate good i is produced by a monopolist or an imitator. The production of
20This could be incorporated explicitly by a model with oligopolistic competition, where the patent
holder competes with one or several imitators. However, our modeling approach captures the essence of
declining expected profits for the patent holder when IPR-enforcement becomes weaker, and it avoids
tedious calculations implied by a set-up with oligopolistic competition.
21As our explicit focus is on IPR-enforcement, we assume that each innovation obtains a patent of
infinite length and neglect the issue of patent breadth. The typical patent-length in most countries is
20 years, while the average legislative term of governments is four years. Hence, an alternative but
analytically more tedious approach would assume a finite patent length and probabilistic enforcement of
the patent (reflected by ωjt) only during this time span. As long as the length of the patent is longer
than the legislative term of the politician, which reflects reality as argued previously, our results will
not be affected qualitatively by such an alternative modeling approach. However, a static model where
both patent length and the legislative term of the government comprise only one period would imply full
commitment with respect to IPR-policy on the side of the government. This would change some of our
results such as an inverted U-shape relation between IPR-enforcement and the innovative strength of an
economy.
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one unit of intermediate i requires one unit of the final output. We choose final output as
the numeraire. Hence marginal production costs of intermediates are equal to unity. The
symmetric equilibrium on the market for intermediates induces equal prices and demand
for all types of intermediates, such that pm,j(i) = pm,j = 1/α, xm,j(i) = xm,j for all
protected intermediates and pc,j(i) = pc,j = 1, xc,j(i) = xc,j for all imitated intermediates.
Demand in Region j for protected intermediates is xm,j = λjα
2
1−α , with λj = LjA
1
1−α
j
reflecting the “effective” market size of Region j. Hence, a small economy in terms of its
population may constitute a large effective market when its productivity level in final-
good production is sufficiently large and vice versa. Patent holders located in the North
can attain operating profits per period pi = P (λs + λn) with P =
(
1−α
α
)
α
2
1−α > 0. If an
intermediate is copied and IPRs are not enforced, it will be sold at the competitive price
pc,j = 1. Then, demand increases to xc,j = λjα
1
1−α , and operating profits in j at time t
are zero.
Given the enforcement level 0 ≤ ωj,t ≤ 1, the number of protected intermediates at time
t is ωj,t ∗Nt, while (1− ωj,t) ∗Nt of the intermediates are imitated. Aggregate output in
Region j writes therefore as
Yj,t = λ
1−α
j
[∫ ωj,tNt
0
[xm,j(i)]
αdi+
∫ (1−ωj,t)Nt
0
[xc,j(i)]
αdi
]
. (2)
Additionally considering that xm,j = α
1
1−αxc,j , we obtain Yj,t = λjNt[1+ωj,t(α
α
1−α−1)]xαc,j,
where ωj,t(α
α
1−α−1) < 0 represents the deadweight loss due to monopolistic competition.22
3.2 Research and development
The North performs R&D in search for new designs (blueprints) of intermediate goods.
Here, we use a lab equipment specification assuming that final output (which incorporates
both labor and intermediate goods) enters as the main factor of production into the R&D
process. A measure Len << Ln of the population in the North has the entrepreneurial
skills to operate a research lab. Each research-lab operates under the cost function
ζ(ηt) =
δη2t
Nt
Len
, (3)
22Notice that for ωj,t = 1, i.e., full patent protection, we obtain the standard Romer (1990) production
function: Yj,t = AjL
1−α
j Nt(α
1
1−αxc,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
xm,j
)α. The case without patent protection, ωj,t = 0, yields the highest
possible output from a static perspective: Yj,t = AjL
1−α
j Ntx
α
c,j . Of course this undermines incentives to
invest in R&D.
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where ηt denotes the number of new inventions at time t and δ reflects the research pro-
ductivity or the quality of the research infrastructure. Alternatively, δ can be interpreted
as a measure of the entrepreneurs’ human capital. That is, the higher the level of hu-
man capital, the lower δ implying that lab-equipment can be used more productively. In
addition, R&D is positively affected by the entrepreneurs’ average level of technological
knowledge Nt
Len
.23
A new blueprint invented in period t can be employed in final-good production from
t+ 1 on and it receives a patent of infinite length. Accordingly, the expected value of an
invention i at time t reads as
Et[V (i)] =
∞∑
τ=t+1
(
τ∏
τˆ=t+1
1
1 + rτˆ
)
P
(
λnωn,τ + λsωs,τ
)
, (4)
where rt is the interest rate in period t.
As Et[V (i)] is the same for all i, we will use the abbreviation Et in the following. Op-
timality requires that marginal costs for an additional invention must equal its expected
value. Consequently, inventions per research lab are given by
ηt = Et
Nt
2δLen
, (5)
and the aggregate stock of technological knowledge evolves according to
Nt+1 −Nt = ηtL
e
n = Et
Nt
2δ
. (6)
Obviously, an increase in effective market size increases expected profits and encourages
therefore innovations.24
23The assumption that both, research productivity (or human capital) as well as the current technology
stock play a positive role for innovative output and are complementary to a certain extent is standard in
the literature. For example, in Romer (1990, p. 86), the aggregate stock of designs evolves according to
A˙ = δaHAA, where A is the stock of designs, HA is human capital and δa is a productivity parameter.
The assumption of decreasing returns on the firm and industry level with respect to R&D expenditures
has been supported empirically, e.g., by Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Hall et al. (1988). On the macro
level, the probably most important source of decreasing returns in R&D can be seen in an increased
probability of duplicative research through an increasing number of both rivals and expenditures, even
though the R&D process as such may be driven by large spillovers (Amir, 2000; Kortum, 1993; Klette and
Kortum, 2004). In a related line of argument, it is possible to think of plausible limits in transforming
an ever increasing stock of new ideas into usable knowledge for production (Weitzman, 1998). From an
aggregate perspective, decreasing returns may also reflect heterogeneity in the cost of research projects.
A similar argument can be found in Scotchmer (2004a, ch. 11). Convex costs of R&D are also widely
used in the industrial organization type literature on IPR-protection (see e.g., Chin and Grossman, 1990;
McCalman, 2002; Lai and Qiu, 2003).
24Schmookler (1966) emphasized that ”the amount of invention is governed by the extent of the mar-
ket.”; see also the discussion in Acemoglu (2009, Ch. 12 and 15.5). In this way, our R&D specification
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3.3 The household’s and the government’s problem
Concentrating on the governments’ IPR-enforcement decisions, we keep the individual
household’s problem deliberately simple. The households in Region j maximize
Uj,t =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tcj,τ , (7)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and 1−β
β
is the rate of time preference which,
in equilibrium, must be equal to the interest rate, such that β = 1
1+rt
for all t.25 For
the entrepreneurs in the North, the maximization problem reduces to the decision of how
much of their income (labor income plus the profit flows from their active patents) to
invest in R&D and how much to consume in each period. This problem is solved by (5).
The households in the North without entrepreneurial skills as well as the households in
the South consume their labor income in each period.
As motivated in the introduction, we intend to examine the effects of politically motivated
short-sighted governments that do not fully take into account the long-run consequences
of their actions. The simplest way to incorporate this aspect into our model is to assume
that at any time t the governments in both regions choose an optimal enforcement level
of IPR so as to maximize26
Wj,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tCj,τ , (9)
is subject to a scale effect in the sense that the size of the population affects the size of markets but not
directly R&D-inputs such as research personnel or, in our particular case, lab-equipment. If we assumed
instead decreasing returns in research output with respect to the existing stock of knowledge following
e.g. Jones (1995), IPR-enforcement would likely affect transitory growth and the steady-state level of
output.
25Consequently, the expected value of an invention can be written as
Et =
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tP
(
λnωn,τ + λsωs,τ
)
. (8)
26Oudiz and Sachs (1985) argue that restricting the planning horizon of the government as we do it here
is a natural way to incorporate short-sightedness of governments into dynamic macroeconomic models.
Our particular modeling choice regarding the planning horizon of the government could be motivated via
short-lived households (with two-period lifes). A minority of the households is altruistic and entertain
research labs. At the cost of further complexity, we could interpret output Y as sophisticated machinery
that can be used either in research or to produce the consumption good via technology F (Lu, Y ), where Lu
denotes unskilled labor. Under the assumption that unskilled workers constitute the non-altruistic (short-
sighted) majority and Lu and Y are complements, there exists a conflict between R&D expenditures and
machinery for the production of the consumption good. Concerning IPR-policy, a re-election motivated
government would then adopt a short-sighted view of the majority of unskilled workers.
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subject to (6). Cj,t stands for aggregate consumption in country j at time t. As men-
tioned in the introduction, we make two additional assumptions concerning the gov-
ernments’ IPR-enforcement choices. First, governments can only commit to a level of
IPR-enforcement for the subsequent period, i.e. ωj,t+1, but not for the indefinite future.
For example, while in office at time t, the government can increase training efforts of staff
responsible for the prosecution and conviction of imitators of protected intermediates. A
larger number of trained officials will then be available in t+1 to enforce the laws on IPR.
Similar arguments apply with respect to other resources or capacity building necessary
for effective enforcement.27 Second, we assume that the enforcement level chosen by the
government in Region j applies to all active patents in the same way.
In a typical period t, the sequence of events can be summarized as follows. First,
intermediate-good production and final-good production take place given the technol-
ogy stock Nt and IPR-enforcement level ωj,t. Then the government announces the level
of IPR-enforcement ωj,t+1 and thereafter the entrepreneurs decide how much to invest in
R&D. Finally, the households consume.
At any time t aggregate consumption in the North as well as the dynamics of the tech-
nology stock (6) depend on the R&D expenditures in t which reflect the entrepreneurs’
expectations about future IPR-enforcement beyond t+1. Let us denote these expectations
at time t by Ω′t+2 ≡ {ω
′
n,τ , ω
′
s,τ}
∞
τ=t+2 and the vector of IPR-enforcement that will finally
realize by Ωt+2. When deciding on IPR-enforcement, ωj,t+1, the governments have expec-
tations about the entrepreneurs’ expectations Ω′t+2, which we refer to by Ω
g
t+2, and on
how the entrepreneurs adapt their expectations in response to the governments’ enforce-
ment choices for period t+1, ωj,t+1. Even under the assumption of rational expectations,
this structure allows for a plenitude of subgame-perfect equilibria. Here, we intend to
minimize complexity by focusing on equilibria that satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1
(i) At any time t, the entrepreneurs’ expectations about future IPR-enforcement Ω′t+2
do not depend on ωj,t+1.
(ii) Each government j takes Nt, ωn,t, ωs,t, (ωk,t+1, k 6= j) and item (i) as given and
maximizes (9) subject to (6) according to its expectations Ωgt+2. Governments do
27The costs of IPR-protection in our model consist of the associated deadweight loss in the consumption-
good market. Additionally including resource-using IPR-protection would increase these costs without
changing the qualitative results. To keep the complexity of the model at a minimum, we abstracted from
costs of IPR-protection beyond deadweight-losses.
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not condition their choices on the history of play before time t.
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), expectations are rational, i.e. Ωgt+2 = Ω
′
t+2 = Ωt+2.
Two remarks are in order. First, in Item (ii) we have used parenthesis for the other region’s
IPR-enforcement choice at time t, because this is taken as given by each government
in the game where IPR-enforcement is chosen decentrally. Later we consider regimes
where a government is able to determine both regions’ enforcement levels in which, of
course, the other region’s IPR-enforcement is not taken as given. Second, given Item
(i) of Assumption 1, the entrepreneurs’ expectations can only be rational if the future
governments’ optimal enforcement choices do not depend on the technology stock. This
is the case as we will see below. As a consequence the economy jumps into a steady state
with constant growth of the technology stock N in the initial period.28
4 Decentralized Enforcement of IPRs
In this section, we examine the strategic interaction between governments with respect to
their national levels of IPR-enforcement. We focus on subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE)
in steady state satisfying Assumption 1. By ’steady state’, we refer to a situation where
the technology stock N (and consequently per capita output and consumption) grows at a
constant rate and expectations about IPR-enforcement are stationary, i.e. ωj,t+1 = ωj,t =
ωj for all j and t. In the next two subsections, we study the South’s and the North’s
maximization problems and describe the unique SPE in steady state thereafter.
4.1 The problem of the South
The objective function of the government in the South at time t can be written as
Ws,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNτλs [Z + ωs,τ(D − P )] , (10)
28More precisely, if Ωt+2 is identical in each period t, the governments’ problems will be the same in
every period and yield a unique solution regarding ωt+1. Rational expectations then imply that these
unique solutions to the governments’ problems be contained in Ωt+2. Hence, under Assumption 1, there
is a unique steady state with rational and stationary expectations. Given these expectations, the growth
rate of the technology stock will immediately jump to its steady state level. This is the equilibrium that
we focus on in our analysis. Moreover, any transitional dynamics of the technology stock would result
from transitional dynamics in the expectations on future IPR-protection Ωt+2. A formal characterization
of the stability of the steady state can be found in Appendix A.1.
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where Z ≡ α
α
1−α−α
1
1−α > 0 reflects the contribution of an intermediate to final output net
of production costs for intermediates and D ≡ α
2α
1−α −α
α
1−α +α
1
1−α −α
2
1−α < 0 represents
the deadweight-loss factor net of production costs for intermediates. The expression
ωs,τNtλsP indicates the profits accruing to the technology owners in the North. The
South’s objective (10) and the constraint (6) reveal the government’s trade-off between
static efficiency and dynamic gains: Stronger IPR-enforcement involves higher deadweight
losses and profit flows to the North while it increases the incentives to innovate in the
North (via Et) and thereby leads to higher productivity of domestic final-good production
in the South. Solving the South’s optimization problem, the reaction function along the
balanced growth path with ωj,t+1 = ωj,t = ωj, writes as
29
ωrs(ωn) = −
(
1− β
2− β
)[
Z
D − P
+
2∆
βP
(
1 +
λn
λs
)]
−
1
2− β
λn
λs
ωn, (11)
where λ ≡ λn+λs denotes the effective size of the world market and ∆ ≡
δ
λ
represents the
North’s research capacity relative to the aggregate effective market size. This notation
turns out to be very convenient for separating the effects of the aggregate world market
size, λ, from those of the relative effective market sizes, λn
λs
. In light of (11), we establish
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (IPR-enforcement in South)
(i) The steady-state level of IPR-enforcement in the South is a strategic substitute to
IPR-enforcement in the North.
(ii) For ωn given, the South’s IPR-enforcement increases with the effective market size of
the South, λs, and with the research productivity of the North – i.e., it is decreasing
in ∆.
The result in Item (i) originates from the fact that IPR-enforcement constitutes a global
public good as far as R&D incentives are concerned. With respect to Item (ii), the South’s
impact on the value of a patent becomes larger when it exhibits a larger effective market
size, thereby reducing its incentive to free-ride on the North’s protection levels.30
29We suppress time indices for steady-state variables. The first-order condition reads as: Rs(ωn, ωs) =(
1 + Et2δ
)
(D − P ) + βλsP2δ [Z + ωs,t+1(D − P )] = 0.
30Note that the South’s level of IPR-enforcement may be perfect, that is ωs = 1. This can be the case
if either ∆ is sufficiently low, i.e., the research productivity in the North relative to the effective world
market is large or the relative size of the effective market in the South is very large implying a small value
of λn
λs
. Further notice that positive consumption levels at any feasible level of IPR-enforcement require
Z > P −D. Consequently, the first term in brackets of (11) is greater than 1 (i.e. Z
D−P
< −1).
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4.2 The problem of the North
In contrast to the government’s objective in the South, the government in the North
additionally accounts for R&D expenditures, E2t /4δ, and profit flows from the South to
the North, ωs,tNtλsP , which are subject to IPR-enforcement in the South. Hence, the
North’s government maximizes
Wn,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNτ
[
λn(Z + ωn,τD) + λsωs,τP −
E2τ
4δ
]
, (12)
subject to (6). We obtain the first-order condition
−Nt
Et
2δ
λnP +Nt+1λnD +Nt
βλnP
2δ
[
λn(Z + ωn,t+1D) + λsωs,t+1P −
E2t+1
4δ
]
= 0 . (13)
A marginal increase in ωn,t+1 involves higher R&D costs in period t lowering current
consumption. This is reflected by the first term in (13). The second term represents the
marginal increase in the deadweight loss in period t+ 1.31 Finally, the marginal benefits
are captured by the last summand of (13) which multiplies the additional number of
innovations, Nt+1 −Nt = Nt
βλnP
2δ
, induced by the marginal increase in IPR-enforcement,
with the future welfare gains per innovation as expressed by the term in brackets.
From (13), we obtain in steady state
Rn(ωn, ωs) ≡
E˜
2∆
(D − P ) +D +
βP
2∆
[
λn
λ
(Z + ωnD) +
λs
λ
Pωs −
E˜2
4∆
]
= 0, (14)
where E˜ = E/λ. Note that E˜ only depends on the relative effective market sizes, λn/λs,
but not on λ. Equation (14) implicitly defines the reaction function of the North, ωrn(ωs).
In the first term of (14), we combined the R&D costs and the deadweight losses of the
innovations created in period t, while the second term represents the deadweight losses
resulting from enforcing the patents created before time t. The government’s future
welfare gains induced by a marginal increase in the North’s level of IPR-enforcement are
still captured in the third term. In the appendix, we show:
Lemma 1
(i) There exists a unique economically sensible solution ωrn(ωs) to Rn(ωn, ωs) = 0.
31Note that, by assumption, the marginally higher IPR-enforcement applies to all active patents in
t+ 1, Nt+1. This includes all innovations created before time t, Nt, as well as those invented in period
t, Nt
Et
2δ .
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(ii) The North’s reaction function ωrn(ωs) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave on
the relevant interval [0, 1].
Lemma 1’s implication of strategic substitutability between ωn and ωs from the perspective
of the North is not obvious. A higher ωs implies higher profit inflows from the South to
the North for all active patents and for those intermediates that are developed in t. On
the one hand, this increases the North’s incentives to tighten its level of IPR-enforcement.
On the other hand, the global public good problem with respect to R&D-incentives acts
to reduce IPR-enforcement in the North when the South increases its enforcement level.
As verified in the proof of Lemma 1 the public good aspect dominates. Hence, national
levels of IPR-enforcement are strategic substitutes to foreign enforcement levels.
4.3 Equilibrium
The reaction functions of the North, ωrn(ωs), and the South, ω
r
s(ωn), possess only one
potentially economically meaningful intersection which we denote by (ωxn, ω
x
s ).
32 However,
the intersection may lie outside of the feasible set [0, 1]2. To account for corner solutions,
let us introduce the notation zˆ ≡ max{min{z, 1}, 0} and zˆ(x) ≡ max{min{z(x), 1}, 0} for
a constant z and a function z(x), respectively. Now we are able to characterize the levels
of IPR-enforcement in a steady-state SPE, (ωen, ω
e
s).
Proposition 2 (Steady-State SPE)
In steady state, there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the IPR-enforcement
game satisfying Assumption 1. The unique enforcement levels in equilibrium are charac-
terized by
ωen =


ωˆrn(0), if ω
x
s ≤ 0,
ωˆxn, if ω
x
s ∈ (0, 1),
ωˆrn(1), if ω
x
s ≥ 1,
ωes =


ωˆrs(0), if ω
x
n ≤ 0,
ωˆxs , if ω
x
n ∈ (0, 1),
ωˆrs(1), if ω
x
n ≥ 1.
In the proof in Appendix A.3, we show that there is only one unique economically sensible
intersection of the reaction functions of the North and the South. Depending on the
parameter values, this intersection will be in the interior of the feasible set of enforcement
32A formal proof can be found in Appendix A.3.
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levels [0, 1]2, or at one of the boundaries. Figure 1 (a) illustrates the case of an interior
equilibrium, while Figure 1 (b) depicts an equilibrium at the boundary of the feasible set.
Proposition 2 characterizes the different cases. As can be observed in the graphs and as
shown in the proof, for all ωs > ω
e
s, the reaction function of the North, ω
r
n, lies above
the one of the South, ωrs , and vice versa for ωs < ω
e
s. This implies that the equilibrium
is unique and stable in the sense that a simple process of steady state best responses
converges to the unique steady state equilibrium. The arrows in Figure 1 indicate such
adjustment dynamics.
ωn
ωs
1
1
ωrn
ωrs
ωes
ωen
(a) Interior equilibrium
ωn
ωs
1
1
ωrn
ωrs
ωes = 0
ωen
(b) Equilibrium at boundary
of feasible set
Figure 1: Equilibrium in the decentralized IPR-enforcement game
Note that in the case of zero IPR-enforcement in the South, i.e., ωes = 0 both countries’
equilibrium enforcement levels are identical to the ones they would implement in a closed
economy. Given ωes > 0, trade opening between North and South lowers the enforcement
level in the North and enhances the level of IPR-enforcement in the South compared
to autarky. The reason for the former is that the regions’ IPR-enforcement levels are
strategic substitutes, while the latter originates from the South’s internalizing the effect
of its IPR-enforcement level on R&D-incentives in the North.
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4.4 The roles of research capacity and market sizes
In our model, the enforcement levels in the steady-state SPE are entirely determined by
the ‘primitives’ α, β,∆, and λn/λs. Our interest centers on how the decentralized steady-
state equilibrium is affected (1) by the research capacity of the North and the global
effective market size captured by the parameter ∆ and (2) by the relative effective market
size of the North and the South, λn
λs
, for a given aggregate market size, i.e. for a given
∆.33
We begin with ∆. Perceiving ωen and ω
e
s as functions of ∆, we obtain
Lemma 2
In an interior equilibrium where (ωen, ω
e
s) ∈ (0, 1)
2,
(i) ωen is strictly concave in ∆.
(ii) ωes is strictly convex in ∆.
In the proof given in the appendix, we first show that ωen is strictly concave in ∆ in an
interior equilibrium. As far as IPR-enforcement levels in the South are concerned, ωes is
a declining line in ∆ if there is no IPR-enforcement in the North. For positive protection
levels in the North, the South’s enforcement level must be strictly below this line as the
protection level of the North acts as a strategic substitute. Consequently, the protection
level of the South becomes convex since IPR-enforcement in the North is concave.
To fully characterize the comparative-statics, we have to account for corner solutions.
There exists a critical level ∆0j , for both regions individually, such that for any ∆ > ∆
0
j
country j is not willing to enforce IPRs.34 This implies for the situation ∆0s < ∆
0
n – i.e.,
the South’s critical threshold level is smaller than the one of the North – that for all
∆0n > ∆ > ∆
0
s the South does not offer protection in equilibrium while the North acts as
in autarky. The opposite holds true in the situation where ∆0n < ∆
0
s. In the following
(see Proposition 3), we focus on the case ∆0s < ∆
0
n and define ∆
0 ≡ ∆0s as the smallest
threshold corresponding to the South. This condition seems to match reality more closely
compared to the opposite case, as it implies a minimum effective market size of the North
33For example, an increase in the North’s market size leaving that of the South unaffected would
increase both, the world market size and the relative market size of North. Consequently, the effect on
the IPR-enforcement level would be a combination of the two effects. For this reason, it seems natural
to isolate the resulting effects from each other.
34This claim is verified analytically in the proof of Proposition 3.
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relative to the South
λn
λs
>
D
D − P
. (15)
Note that the right-hand side of (15) is smaller than one. Hence the inequality is always
satisfied if λn > λs, but it also holds if λn is not too much smaller than λs. In the
next proposition, we characterize the comparative statics of equilibrium IPR-enforcement
levels with respect to changes in ∆ given that condition (15) holds.
Proposition 3 (Effect of ∆ on IPR-enforcement)
If λn
λs
> D
D−P
, then
(i) ωes is positive and strictly decreasing with ∆ for all ∆ < ∆
0, and ωes = 0 for all
∆ ≥ ∆0.
(ii) For interior values, ωen exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with ∆. ω
e
n is
identical to its value in autarky for ∆ > ∆0.
(iii) There exists a unique value ∆x < ∆0 where ωen = ω
e
s . For all interior equilibria,
ωen < ω
e
s if ∆ < ∆
x, and ωen > ω
e
s > 0 if ∆ > ∆
x.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The content of Proposition 3 is illustrated in
Figure 3. To gain an intuition, we depict in Figure 2 the changes of the regions’ reaction
functions in response to a larger effective research capacity in the North, that is in response
to a decline in ∆. As can be observed, the South’s reaction function moves to the right
when ∆ becomes smaller, because a smaller value of ∆ = δ
λ
implies a larger lever exercised
by the South’s IPR-enforcement on innovation incentives in the North. The convex shape
for interior equilibrium values of IPR-enforcement in the South, ωes, as illustrated in Figure
3, arises from the public-good aspect of IPR-enforcement on R&D-incentives as discussed
earlier.
In contrast to the literature, our model predicts an inverted U-shaped relation between the
North’s level of IPR-enforcement and ∆. An intuition for this result can be gained from
scrutiny of the North’s reaction function (14). Using the implicit-function theorem, the
partial derivative of ωrn(ωs) with respect to ∆ can be written as
∂ωrn
∂∆
= −∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂∆
/∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂ωn
.
As we show in the appendix the denominator is negative, implying that the sign of ∂ω
r
n
∂∆
is identical to the one of ∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂∆
, which may be positive or negative. On the one hand,
a decline in ∆ involves an increase in the number of innovations, (βP/2∆). On the other
hand, it increases current R&D expenditures and future deadweight losses (first term in
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ωn
ωs
1
1
ωcn ωrn
ωrs
ωes
ωen
Figure 2: Responses of reaction functions to a decrease in ∆.
(14)). Additionally, welfare per innovation (term in brackets in (14)) declines when ∆
becomes smaller because next period’s R&D expenditures increase, as well.
As we can also observe in (14), both the marginal benefits and marginal costs of an in-
crease of IPR-enforcement in the North depend on the actual strength of IPR-enforcement.
Therefore, we can identify a critical level of IPR-enforcement ωcn(ωs), where the marginal
benefits increase stronger than the marginal costs in response to a decrease in ∆ if
ωrn(ωs) < ω
c
n(ωs) and vice versa for ω
r
n(ωs) > ω
c
n(ωs).
35 The consequent change in the
35For convenience we multiply Rn(ωn, ωs) by ∆ and then take the derivative with respect to ∆. We
obtain that ∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂∆ < 0 if and only if
D +
βP
2∆
E˜2
4∆2
< 0.
Note that ∆Rn(ωn, ωs) = 0 and Rn(ωn, ωs) = 0 yield the same reaction functions ωn(ωs). As E˜
2 depends
on ωn and ωs, we can solve for ωn and obtain that
∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂∆ < 0 if and only if ωn < ω
c
n(ωs), where
ωcn(ωs) =
2λ∆
βPλn
1− β
β
√
−
2∆
βP
D −
λs
λn
ωs.
As ωcn(ωs) is a linear and declining function, it may intersect the North’s reaction function at most twice.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the case with one intersection. In response to a decrease in ∆, the part of the
North’s reaction function which lies below ωcn(ωs) shifts to the upper right, while the part above ω
c
n(ωs)
shifts to the lower left.
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ωen
ωes
∆
∆0∆x
Figure 3: Steady state equilibrium pairs (ωen, ω
e
s) dependent on ∆, with α = 0.3; β =
0.3;λ = 1;λn = 0.445.
North’s reaction function ωrn is illustrated in Figure 2. Hence the new equilibrium after a
decrease of ∆ is at the intersection of the dashed reaction functions in Figure 2. From the
graph we can not infer a general pattern of how the equilibrium IPR-enforcement levels
will react to a change in ∆. However, we show in the Appendix that when ∆ is large,
the benefits of a increase in ωn in response to a marginal decrease in ∆ (the higher num-
ber of innovations) increase stronger than the marginal costs (additional R&D-costs and
deadweight losses). The opposite is the case when ∆ is small. This implies an inverted
U-shaped relation between ωen and ∆ as depicted in Figure 3.
It is important to emphasize that this result is not an implication of convex R&D-costs
at the research lab level. The central assumptions behind this result are that the gov-
ernment does not take full account of the future benefits of R&D and enforces all active
patents at the same strength. It is straightforward to show that in the case of a far-sighted
government which could commit to a particular enforcement level for each vintage over
the entire lifetime of its patent (such as in Grossman and Lai (2004)), a monotonically
declining relationship between ωn and ∆ would result.
36 Similarly, in a one shot game
where the government determines the level of IPR-enforcement once and for all. The gov-
ernments’ limited time horizons and the necessity to enforce all active patents at the same
strength result in different weights between the marginal benefits and the marginal costs
of IPR-enforcement in the government’s first-order condition. While the government can
36A proof is provided upon request.
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only influence the profit flows and deadweight losses in the next period, the induced addi-
tional costs for R&D that accrue in the current period account for the entire net present
value of future profits. The latter cost term takes the dominant role for small values of ∆
leading to an increasing relationship between IPR-enforcement and ∆ in the North. To
the contrary, the South’s decision problem is independent from R&D-expenditures, such
that the dynamic gains from the perspective of the South are monotonically increasing
with the research productivity of the North. As a consequence of this result, we may find
lower IPR-enforcement levels in the North than in the South for sufficiently small ∆, and
vice versa if ∆ is sufficiently large.
Before turning our attention to the comparative statics with respect to relative market
sizes, λn
λs
, we verify that in interior equilibria, the global rate of growth on the balanced
growth path increases when the research capacity becomes larger, even though the North’s
level of IPR-enforcement may be declining at low values of ∆.
Proposition 4 (Effect of ∆ on steady-state growth)
In interior equilibria (ωen, ω
e
s) ∈ (0, 1)
2, the global steady-state growth rate strictly de-
creases with ∆.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.6. Finally we turn to the role of relative market
sizes for IPR-enforcement and economic growth. We focus again on interior equilibria.
Proposition 5 (Effect of relative effective market size)
In interior equilibria (ωen, ω
e
s) ∈ (0, 1)
2, both countries’ IPR-enforcement levels increase
with their relative effective market sizes. The steady-state growth rate is unaffected by
the relative effective market sizes.
The proof is provided in Appendix 5. Governments tighten IPR-enforcement in response
to an increase in their relative market share, since their relative levers in inducing inno-
vations increase. It is possible to draw a graph similar to Figure 2 in order to illustrate
the shifts in the regions’ reaction functions in response to a change in relative effective
market size. We observe directly in the South’s reaction function (11) that the South’s
IPR-enforcement level will increase when the South becomes relatively larger. This in-
volves a shift to the upper right of the reaction function in a coordinate plane like the
one in Figure 2. The statement regarding the North in Proposition 5 cannot be de-
rived directly from its reaction function (14) as there are conflicting forces depending
again on the actual levels of IPR-enforcement: While a relatively larger effective market
size of the South reduces the marginal welfare benefits of additional innovations induced
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by a marginal increase in IPR-enforcement, it increases the profit flows from the South.
Similarly the change of the expected value of a patent depends on the actual levels of IPR-
enforcement in the different regions as the profit flows in the North decline while those
coming in from the South increase. Hence, we again find critical values ωcn(ωs) separating
the part of the North’s reaction function that increases from the part that decreases in
response to a change in relative effective market size. However, as we show analytically
in the appendix, in contrast to a change in ∆ the regions’ equilibrium enforcement levels
will both increase in their relative effective market sizes. In fact, the region becoming
relatively smaller by a marginal change in the relative effective market sizes reduces its
IPR-enforcement level in a symmetric way such that the global discounted profits to be
earned in expectation by an entrepreneur in the North remain unchanged. As a conse-
quence, the steady-state growth rate remains unaffected. In sum, a change in a country’s
effective market size will affect the growth rate only through its effect on the total world
market size but not via a change in its relative market size.
5 Harmonization of IPR-enforcement
As discussed in the introduction, some countries make an effort to harmonize IPR-
enforcement globally, e.g., via ACTA. In this respect, it is interesting to explore which
harmonized IPR-enforcement level the governments of Regions n and s would like to im-
plement given it had the power to do so. These enforcement levels may shed light on the
differences that need to be bridged in international negotiation rounds.37
In our context harmonization means that both regions are subject to the same level of
IPR-enforcement. Hence, expected discounted profits per invention are specified as
Eht =
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tωhj,τPλ, (16)
where ωhj,τ represents the harmonized IPR-enforcement level preferred by Region j.
38 The
evolution of the technology stock is again captured by (6), where discounted profits are
37In the formal bargaining problem, the governments’ most preferred IPR-enforcement levels are the
points on the boundary of the feasible set which will realize if the respective regional government possesses
all the bargaining power. The threat point of the problem is the decentralized equilibrium as described
in the previous section. How close to governments’ ideal enforcement levels the bargaining outcome will
be depends on the relative bargaing power, of course.
38Remember that β = 11+r .
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now determined by (16), such that
Nn,t+1 = Nt
(
1 +
Eht
2δ
)
. (17)
With respect to the governments’ decision problems, we keep with the two major assump-
tions that there is only commitment on IPR-enforcement for one period and all active
patents have to be enforced at the same strength. One may argue that an agreement in
the international arena could serve as a commitment device, partially at least. However,
particularly where IPR-enforcement is concerned rather than formal laws, there is also
the possibility of renegotiations after each period. Here, we stress the latter point.39 This
also allows us to directly compare the results to the ones in the decentralized setting.
5.1 Desired harmonized enforcement level of the South
We begin with the optimization problem of the government located in the South which
chooses a single level of IPR-enforcement that applies to both regions. The South maxi-
mizes
W hs,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNτλs
[
Z + ωhs,τ(D − P )
]
, (18)
subject to (17). Along the balanced growth path, we obtain as the preferred harmonized
enforcement level of the South40
ωhs = −
1 − β
2 − β
(
Z
D − P
+
2∆
βP
)
. (19)
Compared to the decentralized protection game (see Equation (11)), the desired harmo-
nized enforcement level of the South is larger, since the marginal benefits in terms of
R&D incentives increase due to the larger market size in the optimization problem (λ
versus λs) for which enforcement is determined. At the same time, the marginal costs in
terms of deadweight losses in the South and profit outflows to the North remain as in the
decentralized setting. In addition, ωhs is independent from relative market sizes. Equation
(19) reveals that ωhs increases with the North’s research capacity but is independent of the
relative effective market sizes. We summarize these observations in the next proposition.
39Allowing for commitment over a longer finite time horizon would increase the desired levels of IPR-
protection but would not change the characteristics of the problem qualitatively.
40Note that we still assume that the government is able to adjust IPR-enforcement after each period.
Consequently, in period t the South determines the optimal harmonized enforcement level ωhs,t+1 tak-
ing as given the rational beliefs of the entrepreneurs about future governments’ optimal decisions (see
Assumption 1). The first-order condition reads as
(
1 +
Eht
2∆
)
(D − P ) = −β P2∆
[
Z + ωhs,t+1(D − P )
]
.
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Proposition 6 (Desired harmonized IPR-enforcement of the South)
The preferred harmonized level of IPR-enforcement of the South increases with the North’s
research productivity and the global effective market size but is independent of the relative
market sizes.
5.2 Desired harmonized enforcement level of the North
The objective of the government in the North includes profit inflows from the South which
are – contrary to the decentralized IPR-enforcement game – subject to the harmonized
enforcement level of the North
W hn,t =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNτ
[
λn(Z + ω
h
n,τD) + λsPω
h
n,τ −
(
Ehτ
)2
4δ
]
. (20)
In steady state, the North’s optimal level of global IPR-enforcement, ωhn, satisfies
41
Rhn(ω
h
n) ≡
E˜h
2
(D − P ) + ∆(D +
λs
λn
P )
+
βP
2
[
Z + ωhn
(
D + P
λs
λn
)
−
(
E˜h
)2
4∆
(
1 +
λs
λn
)]
= 0. (21)
where E˜h = β
1−β
Pωhn. The next proposition verifies that (21) possess a unique economi-
cally sensible solution and describes the effects of changes in ∆ and the relative market
sizes, λn
λs
, on the preferred harmonized enforcement level of the North.
Proposition 7 (Desired harmonized IPR-enforcement of the North)
There exists a unique economically sensible solution to the North’s optimization problem.
The North’s desired harmonized level of global IPR-enforcement depends on its research
productivity and its relative effective market size as follows:
(i) If λn
λs
< −P
D
, then the North’s desired level of global IPR-enforcement, ωhn, increases
with ∆.
41The North’s first-order condition reads Rhn(ω
h
n,t+1) =
Eht
2λ (D − P ) + ∆(D +
λs
λn
P ) +
βP
2
[
Z + ωhn,t+1
(
D + P λs
λn
)
−
(Eht+1)
2
4∆λλn
]
= 0. As the North controls profit inflows from the South, the
second-order condition for the problem described above may be violated, if λs
λn
is large enough, such that
the marginal gains from profit inflows to the North always overcompensate the marginal R&D costs and
deadweight losses in the North. Then the North opts for complete protection ωhn,t = 1, ∀t. In the follow-
ing, we consider the more interesting case where the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied,
such that λn
λs
> P−2D
P
> 1, since D < 0.
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(ii) If λn
λs
> −P
D
, then there exists a unique value ∆m > 0 where for all ∆ > (<)∆m, the
North’s desired level of IPR-enforcement, ωhn, decreases (increases) with ∆.
(iii) There exists a unique value ∆¯ > 0, where for all ∆ > (<)∆¯, the North’s desired
level of IPR-enforcement, ωhn, decreases (increases) with
λn
λs
.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.8. Concerning the effects of research capacity and
global effective market size (∆), Proposition 7 distinguishes two cases. In the first, (i),
an increase of global IPR-enforcement involves less additional deadweight losses in the
North (−λnD) than additional profit inflows from the South (λsP ). Thus, the only costs
associated with IPR-enforcement are the research costs, and the North’s main objective
in enforcing global IPRs is to reap profits from the South. The latter is cheaper when
∆ increases as this implies lower aggregate R&D expenditures. As a consequence, there
is a positive relation between ωhn and ∆. In the second case, (ii), the profit inflows from
the South are lower than the deadweight losses in the North incurred by an increase in
global IPR-enforcement. In this scenario, the North’s first-order condition with respect
to its most preferred harmonized enforcement level shows a similar structure as the one
in the decentralized game with the difference that a part of the North’s deadweight losses
are compensated for by higher profit inflows from the South. As a consequence, we also
obtain an inverted U-shaped relationship between ωhn and ∆ for which the same intuition
as provided in the discussion of the decentralized setting can be applied.
Contrary to the decentralized enforcement game, the relative effective market size exhibits
a non-monotonic effect on the North’s desired level of IPR-enforcement as indicated by
Item (iii) of Proposition 7. The reason is that changes in the relative effective market
sizes change the weights attached to the different components in the North’s objective
function. As an illustration consider the effect of an increase of λn/λs given λ on the
government’s welfare objective in period t. The latter writes as
Nt
[
λnZ + ω
h
n,t
(
λnD + λsP
)
−
(Eht )
2
4∆
]
. (22)
Substituting λs by λ− λn and taking the derivative with respect to λn given λ yields
Nt
[
Z + ωhn,t
(
D − P
)]
. (23)
Apparently, the marginal change of the North’s periodic welfare with respect to changes
in its own relative market size (23) is structurally equivalent to the periodic welfare of the
South (per effective market size) and is independent of research expenditures since Eht
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∆ωhn
ωhn
ωhs
λn
λs
↑
∆¯
Figure 4: Desired harmonized IPR-enforcement of the North (solid lines) in response to
an increase in λn
λs
(gray versus black solid line). Dashed line: desired harmonized IPR-
enforcement level of the South. Parameters: α = 0.3; β = 0.35;λ = 1;λn = 0.78.
depends only on the effective world market size λ, which remains unchanged. Intuitively,
a larger effective market size of the North gives higher weight to final-good production
and deadweight losses in the North and lower weight to the profit inflow from the South.
That is, an increase in the effective market size of the North gives higher weight to those
components of the North’s periodic welfare that are also present in the South’s. Hence,
the desired IPR-enforcement level of the Northern government approaches the one of the
South when λn/λs increases. However, it will never coincide with ω
h
s , since ω
h
n represents
the solution under autarky for λs = 0 with R&D expenditures still being positive. A
graphical illustration is presented in Figure 4, where the solid gray line reflects the desired
harmonized enforcement level of the North for a lower relative market size λn/λs compared
to the dark solid line. The dark solid curve is closer to the dashed line which represents
the desired harmonized enforcement level of the South.42
42Formally this can be seen as follows. As a direct consequence of the arguments above, it follows that
the derivative of Rhn(ω
h
n) with respect to λn/λs is equivalent to the South’s first-order condition in steady
state (cf. footnote 23)
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ λn
λs
= Rhs (ω
h
s ) ≡
(
1 +
E˜h
2∆
)
(D − P ) + β
P
2∆
(Z + ωhj (D − P )),
with j = n, s. The optimal level of IPR-enforcement of the South is given by
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂
λn
λs
= Rhs (ω
h
s ) = 0.
As (24) is decreasing with ωhj , and given that ∆ is such that the desired value of IPR-enforcement of the
North is higher than that of the South – i.e., ωhn > ω
h
s – an increase of the North’s relative market size
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According to this intuition and Proposition 7 (iii), we infer:
Proposition 8 (North’s and South’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement)
For interior values of ωhn and ω
h
s , ω
h
n < ω
h
s if ∆ < ∆¯, and ω
h
n > ω
h
s if ∆ > ∆¯.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 4 and a proof is provided in the appendix.43
Proposition 8 implies that when the research productivity in the North is very large
(∆ sufficiently small), the South may even desire a higher harmonized enforcement level
than the North. Since we typically observe stronger IPR-enforcement in the developed
Northern countries as compared to the developing Southern countries, we think that
reality is described by ∆ > ∆¯ and ∆ > ∆x implying that ωhn > ω
h
s and ω
e
n > ω
e
s. Then
the North’s desired harmonized enforcement level increases with the relative market size
of the South while its equilibrium enforcement level in the decentralized game declines.44
Consequently, a relatively larger Southern market widens the gap between ωhn and ω
e
n.
The opposite is true for the South: Its desired harmonized level is independent from the
relative market sizes, while the equilibrium level ωes increases with the South’s relative
market size. This implies that the difference between ωes and ω
h
s becomes smaller, since
ωes < ω
h
s as argued in Section 5.1.
In particular, with regard to the ACTA-negotiations our results suggest that small coun-
tries located in the North strongly favor tighter IPR-enforcement as they benefit most
from higher profit inflows from the South, with the latter incurring the correspondingly
large amount of deadweight losses.
6 Constrained Efficiency and Comparison of Regimes
What would be the maximum welfare that governments could achieve by coordinat-
ing their respective levels of IPR-enforcement, but given their inability to escape their
political-economy constraints? We have in mind a global government choosing pairs of
would imply
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂
λn
λs
< 0 and thus
dωhn
d
λn
λs
< 0. This argument follows directly from the implicit-function
theorem. The opposite holds true if ωhn < ω
h
s (see Figure 4).
43Recall that ωˆhn ≡ max{min{ω
h
n, 1}, 0}. Moreover, we changed the set of parameters for illustrative
purposes of interior solutions without altering the qualitative results. The set of parameters employed
in the previous section violates the second order condition of the North, such that the North would
choose full protection, i.e. ωhn = 1. The parameters used in this section imply a corner solution in the
decentralized enforcement game, such that the South opts very fast for zero protection and the North
behaves as in autarky.
44Scotchmer (2004, p. 336 and 346) notes that during the TRIPS negotiations countries with smaller
markets were in favor of stronger protection.
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(ωn,t+1, ωs,t+1) so as to maximize the sum of the regional governments’ welfare. Since
expected profits depend only on the path of Φt = λnωn,t + λsωs,t and not on particular
values of ωn,t and ωs,t, we can rewrite the maximization problem of a global government
in terms of Φt.
45 Hence the constrained efficient pairs of IPR-enforcement, (ωn,t+1, ωs,t+1),
are obtained by solving
max
Ωpt+1
W =
t+1∑
τ=t
βτ−tNt

Zλ+D (λnωn,t + λsωs,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φt
−
E2t
4∆

 , (24)
subject to (6). The necessary condition for a constrained welfare maximum in steady
state reads as
D +
E˜
2∆
(D − P ) +
βP
2∆
(
Z +DΦ/λ−
E˜2
4∆
)
= 0. (25)
Sidestepping the multiplicity of optimal solutions to the global government’s problem,
we focus on the (unique) constrained efficient harmonized solution where the optimal
enforcement level ωp is implemented in both regions and solves (25). In this case, we
obtain Φ = λωp and (25) coincides with the first-order condition of a closed economy
with effective market size λ.
The constrained-efficient solution serves as a theoretical point of reference to which we
relate the enforcement levels obtained from the previous sections. The different levels of
IPR-enforcement are depicted in Figure 5. The regions’ preferred harmonized and the
constrained-efficient enforcement levels intersect at ∆¯ such that ωhn > ω
p > ωhs , if ∆ > ∆¯,
while ωhn < ω
p < ωhs , if ∆ < ∆¯.
The intuition behind this result can be described as follows: for λs → 0 and λn → λ the
preferred harmonized enforcement level of the North must equal the constrained-efficient
solution (ωhn = ω
p) since the world economy consists of the North only. According to
Item (iii) of Proposition 7, ωhn increases with λs/λn if ∆ > ∆¯, but declines if ∆ < ∆¯.
46
Hence, starting from the situation where λs = 0 and λn = λ, an increase in λs/λn turns
ωhn counterclockwise around ∆¯ implying ω
h
n > (<) ω
p if ∆ > (<) ∆¯. As discussed in the
previous section, for a declining ratio λs/λn, ω
h
n approaches ω
h
s but will not coincide with
it in the limit λs/λn → 0. Accordingly, Proposition 8 implies ω
h
s < (>) ω
p for ∆ > (<) ∆¯.
As a consequence, the constrained-efficient IPR-enforcement level is in between the desired
harmonized enforcement levels of the North and the South for all ∆ 6= ∆¯.
45An equivalent result is obtained by Grossman and Lai (2004).
46Intuitively, in the former case the motive of gaining profit flows from the South dominates while in
the latter ∆ is so small that increased R&D expenditures are of greater concern.
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∆ωhn
ωp
ωhs
∆¯
Figure 5: Comparison between the regimes: non-cooperative enforcement, efficient solu-
tion and preferred harmonized enforcement levels. Parameters: α = 0.3; β = 0.4;λ =
1;λn = 0.78.
Concerning the decentralized enforcement level in the North, we know from Proposition 5
that ∂ω
e
n
∂ λn
λs
> 0. Moreover, in the situation where λn = λ, ω
e
n coincides with the constrained-
efficient enforcement level ωp.47 An increase in λs/λn thus implies ω
e
n < ω
p. According
to our previous discussion, it further involves ωen < ω
h
n for ∆ ≥ ∆¯. However, this relation
may not be satisfied for all ∆ < ∆¯.48 We summarize our observations in the following
proposition.
Proposition 9 (Comparison of IPR-enforcement regimes)
(i) At ∆ = ∆¯ the regions’ preferred harmonized enforcement levels correspond to the
constrained efficient harmonized IPR-enforcement, i.e., ωhs = ω
h
n = ω
p.
(ii) For ∆ < ∆¯, ωhs is above and ω
h
n below the constrained-efficient level of IPR-
enforcement. For all ∆ > ∆¯, ωhs is below and ω
h
n above the constrained-efficient
level of IPR-enforcement.
(iii) The decentralized equilibrium level of IPR-enforcement in the North, ωen, is always
below the constrained-efficient level and lower than the North’s desired harmonized
enforcement level if ∆ ≥ ∆¯.
47The reason is that if λn = λ, the decision problem of the North is entirely described by the constrained
efficient problem.
48In this case both, ωen and ω
h
n decline with λs/λn. Conditions under which ω
e
n < ω
h
n for all ∆ ≥ ∆¯
will be provided upon request.
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The world economy is arguably best described by ∆ > ∆¯. As stated in Proposition 9
and depicted in Figure 5, the preferred harmonized enforcement level of the North ex-
ceeds the constrained-efficient level which in turn is higher than the preferred harmonized
enforcement level of the South. Since the steady-state growth rate is a linear function
of IPR-enforcement, the implementation of ωhn would be most conducive for economic
growth.49 On the other hand, for small values of ∆, the decentralized game yields the
lowest aggregate incentives for R&D and consequently the lowest steady-state growth
rate. Interestingly, the latter may even fall below the resulting growth rate if the South’s
desired harmonized level of IPR-enforcement were adopted globally.50
7 Welfare
Whether the South should adopt the IPR-standards of the North is one of the most
debated questions in the political arena.51 However, it is not clear to which IPR-standards
of the North the discussion refers to: the equilibrium choice of the North or its desired
harmonized enforcement level. Figure 5 in the previous section suggests that even though
the difference between the North’s and the South’s equilibrium choices can be substantial,
the South’s desired harmonized IPR-enforcement level can be quite close to the North’s
equilibrium choice. Hence, a binding adoption of the North’s equilibrium enforcement
level might not be such a contentious issue as opposed to the implementation of the
North’s most preferred harmonized protection level of IPRs. We therefore explore the
welfare effects in the South resulting from the implementation of ωhn along the balanced
growth path as compared to the implementation of ωhs .
52 Aggregate welfare in the South
can be written as
W¯s(ω
h
j ) =
1
1− β(1 + g(ωhj ))
λs
[
Z + ωhj (D − P )
]
, (26)
with g(ωhj ) =
Pωhj
2∆
β
1−β
and j = n, s.53 The results are depicted in Figure 6.
The gray solid line reflects the South’s overall welfare, W¯s(ω
h
s ), obtained from its gov-
49As can be inferred directly from (6), the steady-state growth rate can be written as g(ωhj ) =
E˜
2∆ .
50This can be the case when λs/λn is large (however still satisfying (15)). Using the set of parameters
employed in this section, we obtain ωes = 0 (even for ∆ < ∆¯). The North behaves as in autarky where
ωen < ω
p < ωhn for ∆ > ∆¯ = 0.005. The resulting growth rate per year for ∆ = 0.009 implying ω
e
n ≈ 0.85
and ωhs ≈ 0.75 equals g
e ≈ 3.6% and g(ωhs ) ≈ 3.8%.
51See e.g., Lai and Qiu (2003).
52We do not consider welfare effects in the North, which are very intuitive: The implementation of ωhs
in the North causes welfare losses there relative to the implementation of ωhn, since the South neglects
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∆∆0f → ω
f
s = 0
∆0h → ω
h
s = 0
W¯nhs W¯
sh
s W¯
sf
s
Figure 6: Welfare effects in the South due to the implementation of ωhs , ω
h
n and ω
f
s as
a function of ∆, respectively (W¯ shs corresponds to ω
h
s ; W¯
nh
s corresponds to ω
h
n; W¯
sf
s
corresponds to ωfs ).
ernment’s preferred harmonized enforcement level, while the dashed line represents the
long-term welfare level, W¯s(ω
h
n), realized by accepting the Northern government’s desired
harmonized enforcement level. Figure 6 depicts the welfare levels for values of ∆ higher
than ∆¯ with ωhn > ω
h
s according to Proposition 8. The figure indicates that for a rela-
tively high research capacity in the North, the implementation of ωhn would induce welfare
gains in the South compared to the implementation of its own preferred harmonized en-
forcement level, ωhs . For large values of ∆, however, the South suffers welfare losses by
implementing ωhn rather than ω
h
s .
The result that the South gains in welfare from implementing the desired harmonized IPR-
enforcement level of the North can be explained by the Southern government’s limited
time horizon. To illustrate this, we calculate the simple one-shot solution to maximizing
welfare in the South given by (26). That is, the government in the South selects the
global level of IPR-enforcement at t = 0 which is then fixed for all times. The welfare
level realized from the implementation of this enforcement level, which we denote by ωfs ,
the impact of ωhs on R&D expenditures and profit inflows to the North.
53We use the same set of parameters as before: α = 0.3;β = 0.4;λ = 1;λn = 0.78. Details on the
calculations can be obtained upon request.
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is indicated by the solid dark line in Figure 6.54 We use ∆0f to denote the value of ∆ where
for all ∆ ≥ ∆0f even the full commitment solution of the government in the South will
imply no IPR-enforcement. For a large range of ∆-values smaller than ∆0f , we directly
observe in Figure 6 that the South’s welfare level obtained from the implementation of
the North’s desired harmonized enforcement level approximates the one realized in the
full commitment case. The intuition is that the government in the South would enforce
IPR stronger if its planning horizon accounted for the entire future welfare associated
with innovations. However, as we observe in the figure, at least for ∆ ≥ ∆0f where the full
commitment solution involves no IPR-enforcement will the implementation of a positive
level of IPR-enforcement ωhn entail welfare losses. Consequently, if the research capacity of
the North is large accepting the North’s desired level of IPR-enforcement in international
negotiation rounds such as ACTA would foster long-term welfare in the South. However,
the opposite is true when the research capacity is low.55
8 Summary and Conclusions
Even though most countries have agreed to harmonize intellectual property rights by sign-
ing TRIPs, there is much dispute about the enforcement of IPR in the world. This paper
examines IPR-enforcement in an endogenous growth framework with two open economies.
We incorporate three assumptions that distinguish our paper from the previous literature
and add realistic features to the model. These are that in each economy all active patents
are enforced at the same (endogenously chosen) strength, the governments cannot fully
commit to IPR-enforcement for the indefinite future and have limited planning horizons,
54Note that ωfs must satisfy the first-order condition
2δ
P
(1 +
E˜
2∆
)(D − P ) +
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−t(1 + g)τ−t−1λs
[
Z + ωfs (D − P )
]
= 0.
The first-order condition concerning the (one-shot) full-commitment problem differs from the one with
limited commitment (19) with respect to the second summand which represents the discounted benefit
of a change in IPR-enforcement for all future periods. It follows that the South would prefer a higher
harmonized enforcement level when full commitment were available – i.e., W¯s(ω
f
s ) > W¯s(ω
h
s ).
55Note that for ∆¯ where ωhs = ω
h
n > 0 we have W¯
nh
s = W¯
sh
s . As the full commitment solution of the
South involves ωfs > ω
h
s for all ∆ where ω
h
s > 0, we must have W¯
nh
s > W¯
sh
s for at least a small range of
values ∆ > ∆¯ as there ωhn > ω
h
s with ω
h
n and ω
h
s arbitrarily close due to the continuity of ω
h
n and ω
h
n in ∆.
Regarding all values ∆ > ∆0f , we clearly obtain W¯
nh
s ≤ W¯
sh
s . Consequently, there exists a cut-off-value
∆ws where for all ∆¯ < ∆ < ∆ws we have W¯
nh
s > W¯
sh
s . In the case depicted in Figure 6, the cut-off
is unique implying that for all ∆ > ∆ws we have W¯
nh
s ≤ W¯
sh
s . Since for all ∆ < ∆¯ we have ω
h
s > ω
h
n
implying that W¯nhs < W¯
sh
s , there will be no such cut-off like ∆ws for ∆-values smaller than ∆¯.
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e.g. due to re-election concerns.
While the governments in the decentralized game provide too little IPR-enforcement rela-
tive to the constrained-efficient solution that maximizes the governments’ aggregate wel-
fare under the previous assumptions, both regions, the North and the South, desire higher
IPR-protection relative to the equilibrium enforcement levels if they were able to select a
harmonized world enforcement level. Typically, the North’s desired harmonized enforce-
ment level is larger than the constrained efficient one while that of the South is lower. The
difference between the North’s and the South’s desired harmonized enforcement levels in-
creases with the relative market size of the South, thus amplifying the clash of interests in
international negotiations. Moreover, we find that the smaller a region’s relative market
size, the larger is the difference between its equilibrium choice and the ideal harmonized
enforcement desired on the international level.
Concerning the discussion whether the South suffers welfare losses from adopting the
desired IPR-enforcement levels of the North, our numerical welfare example suggests that
as long as the North’s research capacity is not too low, the South may well benefit in terms
of overall long-term welfare. However, when the research capacity is low, the dynamic
gains realized would not justify the large profit outflows even from a long-term welfare
perspective.
It is frequently assumed in the political economy literature as well as in parts of the
dynamic macroeconomic literature that governments act in a short-sighted way. Our
paper highlights that such an assumption can change the above results in counterintuitive
ways for very high levels of the North’s research capabilities. In particular the North’s
short-sighted government’s IPR-enforcement level in equilibrium and also the desired
harmonized level may decline with its research productivity. As a consequence, the short-
sighted government in the South may choose a higher equilibrium and desired harmonized
enforcement level than the North.
With regard to ACTA, the countries working out the agreement correspond to what we
have referred to as the innovative Northern countries in our analysis. Assuming that
ACTA reflects their desired globally harmonized level of IPR-enforcement, our results
suggest that, under realistic research capabilities, the ACTA-enforcement levels are higher
than the globally efficient harmonized level of IPR-enforcement and also higher than the
desired harmonized enforcement levels in the South. This would increase the growth
rates of both, the North and the South. However, our numerical example suggests that the
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South will likely loose in terms of welfare. Consequently, even if the Northern countries will
ratify the treaty, their hopes that ACTA will become a global pact by the less innovative
Southern countries also signing the agreement will likely be disappointed.
Our paper opens up several avenues for future research. It would be interesting to extend
the enforcement game to one where both regions are active in research and to consider
more than two countries. Further, the framework developed can be used to study several
important aspects of IPR-protection such as blocking patents, differences in preferences
between the countries or principal-agent problems in R&D joint ventures and their con-
sequences for long-run development.
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A Appendix
A.1 Stability properties of the decentralized equilibrium
The characterization of the stability properties proceeds as follows:
Step 1: We derive the evolution of the technology stock as a function of next period’s IPR-
levels of Region j = n, s and given the future expectations on IPR-enforcement
Ωt+2.
Step 2: We derive next period’s IPR-levels of Region j = n, s from the respective govern-
ments’ first-order conditions.
Step 3: We obtain from the last step an expression for the evolution of the technology stock
which depends on future expectations on IPR-enforcement and parameters only.
This implies that the steady state is stable with respect to a perturbation of ωjt or
the growth rate gt from the steady state.
Step 1: Note that
Assumption 2
(i) At any time t, the entrepreneurs’ expectations about future IPR-enforcement
Ω′t+2 do not depend on ωj,t+1.
(ii) Each government j takes Nt, ωn,t, ωs,t, (ωk,t+1, k 6= j) and item (i) as given and
maximizes aggregate welfare subject to the evolution of the technology stock
according to its expectations Ωgt+2. Governments do not condition their choices
on the history of play before time t.
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), expectations are rational, i.e. Ωgt+2 = Ω
′
t+2 = Ωt+2.
Given Assumption 1, governments care only about wj,t+1, j = n, s while expectations
beyond period t+ 1, i.e. Ωt+2 are not affected.
The expected value of an invention at date t (4) reads in equilibrium with β = 1
1+r
as
Et[V (i)] =
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tP
(
λnωn,τ + λs.ωs,τ
)
(A.1)
Given Assumption 1 each government commits credibly for the next period’s en-
forcement level taking the other region’s enforcement level, the technology stock
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and future expectations as given. Therefore, we expand the expected value of an
invention as follows
Et = βP
(
λnωn,t+1 + λsωs,t+1
)
+ Et+1. (A.2)
We recall that Et+1 depends on future expectations Ωt+2, and consequently so does
Et. The evolution of technological knowledge as specified in Eq. (6) reads thus
gt+1 =
Nt+1
Nt
− 1 =
Et
2δ
(A.3)
gt+1 =
βP
(
λnωn,t+1 + λsωs,t+1
)
+ Et+1
2δ
. (A.4)
Step 2: From the first order condition of the South(
1 +
Et
2δ
)
(D − P ) +
βλsP
2δ
[Z + ωs,t+1(D − P )] = 0, (A.5)
we obtain (given Ωt+2 and ωn,t+1) and in light of (A.4)
ωs,t+1 =
−(D − P + βPλsωn,t+1D − βP
2λsωn,t+1 + βPEt+1D − βP
2Et+1 + βλsZ)
βλs(D − P )(P + 1)
.
(A.6)
As the first-order condition of the North reads
Nt
Et
2δ
λnP +Nt+1λnD
+Nt
βλnP
2δ
[
λn(Z + ωn,t+1D) + λsωs,t+1P −
(Et+1)
2
4δ
]
= 0 (A.7)
we obtain similarly
ωn,t+1 = −
1
4
4βPδ(λnZ +DEt+1 +Dλsωst+1 − PEt+1) + 8Dβ
2 − β(Et+1)
2
δβPλn(−P + 2D)
.
(A.8)
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Figure 7: Stability properties
Step 3: Combining (A.6) and (A.8), we obtain
ω¯n,t+1 =
Ψn
−4(λnδ(D − P )(−P + 2D +DP − P 2)Pβ)
56 (A.9)
and
ω¯s,t+1 =
Ψs
(4(λsβδ(D − P )(−P + 2D +DP − P 2)))
57 (A.10)
Therefore, the dynamics of the stock of technological knowledge evolves according
to
gt+1 =
βP
(
λnω¯n,t+1 + λsω¯s,t+1
)
+ Et+1
2δ
. (A.11)
The last expression depends only on parameters and future expectations on IPR-
enforcement beyond t+1., i.e. Ωt+2. Moreover gt+1 is independent from gt, such that
the gt+1-locus is a horizontal line in the (gt+1; gt)-plane. Its location and its intercept
with the 450-line is therefore entirely determined by parameters and beliefs about
the future level of IPR-enforcement. For a given set of future beliefs, any deviation
56Ψn ≡ 4δP
3βEt+1 − (Et+1)
2βDP + 4δP 4βEt+1 − (Et+1)
2βDP 2 + 4λnZβδDP − 4δDPβλsZ +
4λnZβδDP
2 + 8δ2D2 + (Et+1)
2βP 2 + 4δP 2D − 4δD2P + 8δ2D2P − 8δ2DP 2 − 8δ2DP + (Et+1)
2βP 3 −
4λnZβδP
2 − 8δP 2βEt+1D + 4δD
2βPEt+1 − 4λnZβδP
3 − 4δP 3βEt+1D
57Ψs ≡ −(Et+1)
2βP 2 − 4δP 2βEt+1D + 4δP
2 + 4λnZβδP
2 − 4δPβλsZ − 12δDP + (Et+1)
2βDP +
4δD2βPEt+1 + 8δ
2DP − 4λnZβδDP + 8D
2δ − 8δ2D2 + 8DβλsZδ.
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from the steady state of one or both regions’ IPR-enforcement at time t, ωjt, is
followed by a jump back into the steady state as a best response compatible with
the unique Nash-equilibrium (see Figure 7, dashed arrows). Moreover, starting with
a growth rate of technological knowledge below its long-run level g∗, the economy
will jump into the steady state while its level is determined by the set of expectations
(see Figure 1, solid arrows).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) AsRn(ωn, ωs) is a quadratic function of ωn, we obtain two roots when solving Rn(ωn, ωs) =
0 for ωn. We denote these two roots by ωn1 and ωn2:
ωn1(ωs) =
1
β2P 2λn
[
G(ωs) + 2
√
∆λH(ωs)
]
(A.12)
ωn2(ωs) =
1
β2P 2λn
[
G(ωs)− 2
√
∆λH(ωs)
]
where
G(ωs) = −β
2λsP
2ωs − 2(1− β)∆λ(−(2− β)D + P ) < 0,
H(ωs) = ∆λ[(2− 3β + β
2)2D2 + (1− β)2(P 2 − 4(1− β)DP ))]
+(1− β)2β2P 2(λnZ − λs(D − P )ωs) > 0.
The signs of G(ωs) and H(ωs) imply that ωn2(ωs) is negative for all values ωs ≥ 0. In
contrast, ωn1(ωs) can be positive. Hence the latter is the only economically sensible
solution and we define ωrn(ωs) ≡ ωn1(ωs).
(ii) Taking the second derivative of ωrn(ωs) with respect to ωs gives
d2ωrn(ωs)
dω2s
= −
(1− β)4β2∆2λ2λ2s(D − P )
2P 2
2λn[H(ωs)]
3
2
< 0, ∀ωs ≥ 0.
Note that H(ωs) > 0 for all ωs ≥ 0. Thus ω
r
n(ωs) is strictly concave.
To show that ωrn(ωs) is strictly decreasing on [0, 1], we use the implicit-function theorem.
The partial derivative of Rn(ωn, ωs) with respect to ωn reads
∂Rn(ωn, ωs)
∂ωn
=
1
2
∂E˜
∂ωn
(D − P ) +
βP
2
(
D −
E˜
2∆
∂E˜
∂ωn
)
< 0.
As the monopoly distortion D is negative, the derivative is smaller than zero for all
(ωn, ωs) ∈ R
2
+. The derivative of Rn(ωn, ωs) with respect to ωs can be written as
∂Rn(ωn, ωs)
∂ωs
= −
β2
1 − β
P 2λs
2λ
+
1
2
∂E˜
∂ωs
(
D −
βP
2
E˜
∆
)
< 0.
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The implicit-function theorem then implies
dωn
dωs
= −
∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂ωn
∂Rn(ωn,ωs)
∂ωs
< 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The intuition of the proof can be summarized as follows. First, we show that there is a
unique economically sensible intersection of the reaction functions of the North and the
South. Then we verify that the reaction function of the North intersects the one of the
South from below. This implies that there exists a stable “cobweb mechanism” towards
the intersection of the reaction functions. This mechanism leads to a unique equilibrium
which is the intersection of the reaction function itself if the intersection is in the feasible
set. Otherwise it determines a unique equilibrium on the boundary of the feasible set.
(1)
We show that there is a unique economically sensible intersection of the reaction functions
of the North and the South.
Let us define ωs as the solution to H(ωs) = 0, where H(ωs) is given in the proof of Lemma
1. Since H(ωs) > 0, ∀ωs ≥ 0, we obtain ωs < 0 and that ω
r
n(ωs) is a real number for all
ωs > ωs. Further, ω
r
n(ωs) is strictly concave on (ωs,∞) according to the proof of Lemma
1. Inserting ωrs(ωn) given by (11) into Rn(ωn, ωs) yields R
e
n(ωn). Solving R
e
n(ωn) = 0 for
ωn gives
ωxn1 =
1
β2P 2λn
[
Q1(∆) + 2
√
(2− β)2∆λ2Q2(∆)
]
, (A.13)
ωxn2 =
1
β2P 2λn
[
Q1(∆)− 2
√
(2− β)2∆λ2Q2(∆)
]
,
where
Q1(∆) =
β2λsZP
2
D − P
+ 2∆λ((3− β)(2− β)D − (4− 3β)P ) < 0,
Q2(∆) = (3− β)
2∆D2 − 4(3− 2β)∆DP + P 2(2(2− β)∆ + β2Z) > 0.
Since Q2(∆) > 0, R
e
n(ωn) possesses two real roots – i.e., the reaction functions ω
r
n(ωs) and
ωrs(ωn) possess two intersections on the real plane. As Q1(∆) < 0, ω
x
n2 is strictly negative
for all relevant parameter values and only ωxn1 possesses economical relevance. Hence, we
have ωxN = ω
x
n1.
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Given a unique ωxn, we can immediately infer from (11) that ω
x
s = ω
r
s(ω
x
n) is also unique.
(2)
Now, we show that the reaction of the North intersects the one of the South from below.
We define ω¯s ≡ ω
r
s(ω
x
n2) and the inverse of the South’s reaction function
58
ωsn(ωs) = (1− β)
[
Z
D − P
λs
λn
+
2∆
βP
λ
λn
]
− (2− β)
λs
λn
ωs. (A.14)
Part (1) of the proof together with strict concavity of ωrn(ωs) on (ωs,∞) and ω
s
n(ωs) being
a strictly decreasing linear function yields the following lemma.
Lemma 3
On the interval (ωs, ω¯s), ω
r
n(ωs) intersects ω
s
n(ωs) from below.
ωrn(ωs) < ω
s
n(ωs), if ωs < ωs < ω
x
s
ωrn(ωs) > ω
s
n(ωs), if ω
x
s < ωs < ω¯s.
(3)
We have to show that
(i) if ωxn ≤ 0 and ω
x
s ≤ 0, the unique equilibrium is (ωn, ωs) = (ωˆ
r
n(0), 0).
(ii) if ωxn ≤ 0 and ω
x
s ∈ (0, 1), the unique equilibrium is (ωn, ωs) = (0, ωˆ
r
s(0)).
(iii) if ωxn ≤ 0 and ω
x
s ≥ 1, the unique equilibrium is (ωn, ωs) = (ωˆ
r
n(1), ωˆ
r
s(0)).
(iv) if ωxn ∈ (0, 1) and ω
x
s ≤ 0, the unique equilibrium is (ωn, ωs) = (ωˆ
r
n(0), 0).
(v) if ωxn ∈ (0, 1) and ω
x
s ∈ (0, 1), the unique equilibrium is (ωn, ωs) = (ω
x
n, ω
x
s ).
(vi) if ωxn ∈ (0, 1) and ω
x
s ≥ 1, the unique equilibrium is (ωn, ωs) = (ωˆ
r
n(1), 1).
(vii) if ωxn ≥ 1 and ω
x
s ≤ 0, the unique equilibrium is (ωn, ωs) = (ωˆ
r
n(0), ωˆ
r
s(1)).
(viii) if ωxn ≥ 1 and ω
x
s ∈ (0, 1), the unique equilibrium is (ωn, ωs) = (1, ωˆ
r
s(1)).
(ix) if ωxn ≥ 1 and ω
x
s ≥ 1, the unique equilibrium is (ωn, ωs) = (1, 1).
The existence of the equilibrium is established as follows.
58Note that this is possible as ωs(ωn) is a bijection.
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(i) Suppose that ωxn ≤ 0 and ω
x
s ≤ 0. Given ωs = 0, the best response of North is ωˆ
r
n(0).
Given ωn = ωˆ
r
n(0), we obtain ω
r
s(ω
r
n(0)) ≤ 0 by using Lemma 3 and the fact that
ωrs(ωn) is strictly declining. Consequently, the South’s best response to ωn = ωˆ
r
n(0)
is ωs = 0.
(ii) Suppose that ωxn ≤ 0 and ω
x
s ∈ (0, 1). Given ωs = ωˆ
r
s(0), then best response of
North is 0 because ωrn(ωˆ
r
s(0)) ≤ 0 due to ω
r
s(ωn) being a strictly declining function
and Lemma 3. Given ωn = 0, the South’s best response is ωˆ
r
s(0).
(iii) Suppose that ωxn ≤ 0 and ω
x
s ≥ 1. We distinguish the cases where ω
r
n(1) ≤ 0
and ωrn(1) > 0. If ω
r
n(1) ≤ 0, the equilibrium can be written as (ωn, ωs) =
(0, ωˆrs(0)). ω
r
n(1) ≤ 0 together with Lemma 3 and ω
r
s(ωn) strictly declining im-
plies that ωrn(ωˆ
r
s(0)) ≤ 0. Hence, the best response of the North is ωn = 0. Further,
given ωn = 0, ωˆ
r
s(0) is the best response of the South.
If ωrn(1) > 0, the equilibrium can be written as (ωn, ωs) = (ωˆ
r
n(1), 1). Given ωs = 1,
ωˆrn(1) is best response of North. ω
r
n(1) > 0 together with Lemma 3 and ω
r
s(ωn)
strictly declining imply ωrs(ω
r
n(1)) ≥ 1. Consequently, the South’s best response is
ωs = 1.
(iv) Suppose that ωxn ∈ (0, 1) and ω
x
s ≤ 0. Given ωs = 0, the best response of North is
ωˆrn(0). Given ωn = ωˆ
r
n(0), ω
r
s(ω
r
n(0)) ≤ 0 follows from Lemma 3 and ω
r
s(ωn) being a
strictly declining function. Hence, the South’s best response is ωs = 0.
(v) Let ωxn ∈ (0, 1) and ω
x
s ∈ (0, 1). Then (ωn, ωs) = (ω
x
n, ω
x
s ) is an equilibrium by the
definition of the reaction functions.
(vi) Let ωxn ∈ (0, 1) and ω
x
s ≥ 1. Given ωs = 1, the best response of North is ωˆ
r
n(1).
Given ωn = ωˆ
r
n(1), the South’s best response is ωs = 1 as ω
r
s(ω
r
n(1)) ≥ 1 due to
Lemma 3 and ωrs(ωn) being a strictly declining function.
(vii) Suppose that ωxn ≥ 1 and ω
x
s ≤ 0. We distinguish the cases where ω
r
n(0) ≤ 1 and
ωrn(0) > 1. If ω
r
n(0) ≤ 1, the equilibrium can be written as (ωn, ωs) = (ωˆ
r
n(0), 0).
Given ωs = 0, ωˆ
r
n(0) is best response of the North. Due to Lemma 3 and ω
r
s(ωn) being
a strictly declining function, ωrs(ω
r
n(0)) ≤ 0. Consequently, South’s best response is
ωs = 0.
If ωrn(0) > 1, the equilibrium can be written as (ωn, ωs) = (1, ωˆ
r
s(1)). ω
r
n(0) > 1
together with Lemma 3 and ωrs(ωn) being a strictly declining function implies that
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ωrn(ωˆ
r
s(1)) ≥ 1. Hence, the best response of the North is ωn = 1. Further, given
ωn = 1, ωˆ
r
s(1) is the best response of the South.
(viii) Suppose that ωxn ≥ 1 and ω
x
s ∈ (0, 1). Given ωs = ωˆ
r
s(1), Lemma 3 and ω
r
s(ωn)
strictly declining imply that ωrn(ωˆ
r
s(1)) ≥ 1. Consequently, the North’s best response
is ωn = 1. Given ωn = 1, the South’s best response is ωs = ωˆ
r
s(1).
(ix) Let ωxn ≥ 1 and ω
x
s ≥ 1. Since both functions, ω
r
n(ωs) and ω
s
n(ωs) are declining
on R+, ω
x
n ≥ 1 and ω
x
s ≥ 1 implies that ω
r
n(ωs), ω
s
n(ωs) ≥ 1 for all ωs ∈ [0, 1] and
ωrs(ωn) ≥ 1 for all ωn ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, given ωs = 1, ω
r
n(1) ≥ 1 leading to
ωn = 1 as the best response of the North. Given ωn = 1, the best response of the
South is ωs = 1 as ω
r
s(1) ≥ 1.
(4)
Concerning uniqueness, Lemma 3 and the fact that ωrs(ωn) and ω
s
n(ωs) are strictly declin-
ing functions imply that ∀ωs ∈ [0, 1] and ωs 6= ω
e
s , we have ωˆ
r
s(ωˆ
r
n(ωs)) 6= ωs. Further
∀ωn ∈ [0, 1] and ωn 6= ω
e
n, we obtain ωˆ
r
n(ωˆ
r
s(ωn)) 6= ωn. As a consequence, the equilibrium
(ωn, ωs) = (ω¯
x
n, ω
e
s) as given in Proposition 2 is unique. ✷
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that
ωxn =
1
β2P 2λn
[
Q1(∆) + 2
√
(2− β)2∆λ2Q2(∆)
]
,
where
Q1(∆) =
β2λsZP
2
D − P
+ 2∆λ((3− β)(2− β)D − (4− 3β)P ) < 0,
Q2(∆) = (3− β)
2∆D2 − 4(3− 2β)∆DP + P 2(2(2− β)∆ + β2Z) > 0.
The second derivative of ωxn with respect to ∆ reads
d2ωxn
d∆2
= −
(2− β)β2P 2λZ
2λnQ2(∆)
3
2
< 0.
Concerning the convexity of the South’s IPR-level in ∆, we use equation (11) and take
the second derivative with respect to ∆ to obtain
d2ωxs
d∆2
= −
1
2 − β
λn
λs
d2ωxn
d∆2
< 0. (A.15)
Since d
2ωxn
d∆2
< 0, d
2ωxs
d∆2
must be positive and hence, ωxs is strictly convex in ∆. ✷
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
To verify the three items of Proposition 3, it is necessary to show that ωxs is strictly
convex and declining with ∆, while ωxn is strictly concave and exhibits an inverted U-
shaped relation with ∆. Then determining the roots of ωxs and ω
x
n in ∆ identifies ∆
0
s and
∆0n. Comparing ∆
0
s and ∆
0
n yields condition (15).
Item (i) of Proposition 3 follows from the properties of ωxs mentioned above. For Item (ii)
it is necessary to additionally show that ωrn(0) (i.e., the North’s IPR-enforcement level in
autarky) is strictly concave in ∆ and intersects with ωxn from above at ∆
0(≡ ∆0s). Since
ωen is identical to ω
x
n for all ∆ < ∆
0 and identical to ωrn(0) for all ∆ ≥ ∆
0, this implies that
ωen is strictly concave and shows an inverted U-shape over the entire relevant interval, but
is – of course – not differentiable at ∆0. Item (iii) follows from the properties of ωxn and
ωxs given that condition (15) is satisfied.
The proof is organized as follows. First, we derive ωrs(0) and ω
s
n(0) as well as some notation
and lemmata that will be used throughout the proof. Then, we show the existence of ∆0n
and that condition (15) is necessary and sufficient for ∆0s < ∆
0
n. In the remainder of the
proof, we verify items (i)-(iii) of the proposition.
ω
∆
ωsn(0)
ωrs(0)
ωn,crit
ωen
∆c ∆
0 ∆sm
Figure 8: Illustration of the proof of Proposition 3
From the South’s reaction function (11), we obtain the values of IPR-protection in the
South given that ωn = 0 as
ωrs(0) = −
(
1− β
2− β
)[
Y
D − P
+
2∆
βP
λ
λs
]
. (A.16)
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ωrs(0) is zero at the value
∆sm = −
βλsY P
2λ(D − P )
. (A.17)
Now, consider the level of IPR-protection of the North such that the South would just
choose a zero level of protection. This corresponds to the inverse of ωrs(ωn) at the point
ωs = 0 – i.e.,
ωsn(0) = −(1− β)
[
λs
λn
Y
D − P
+
2∆
βP
λ
λn
]
. (A.18)
ωsn(0) defines a line in the ω −∆ coordinate plane that intersects with ω
r
s(0) at ∆
s
m.
Let us now consider Ren(ωn), which is derived by inserting ω
r
s(ωn) as given by (11) into
the first-order condition of the North (14). From the first part of the proof of Proposition
2, we know that Ren(ωn) possesses two real roots, ω
x
n1 and ω
x
n2. The economically sensible
one is the larger root ωxn1 implying ω
x
n ≡ ω
x
n1. By showing that R
e
n(ωn) is strictly concave,
we establish
Lemma 4
(i) ∀ ωn > ω
x
n2, R
e
n(ωn) > (<) 0 ⇔ ωn < (>) ω
x
n.
(ii) dR
e
n(ωn)
dωn
∣∣∣
ωn=ωxn
< 0.
Proof. Ren(ωn) can be written as
Ren(ωn) =
D − P
2
β
2− β
P
(
λn
λ
ωn − A1
)
+∆D +
βP
2
[
λn
λ
(Y + ωnD)− P
1− β
2− β
A1 − P
λn
λ
ωn
2− β
−
(
β
2− β
)2
P 2
4∆
(
λn
λ
ωn − A1
)2]
.
where A1 =
Y
D−P
λs
λ
+ 2∆
βP
. Taking the second derivative with respect to ωn, we obtain
∂2Ren(ωn)
∂ω2n
= −
(
β
2− β
)2
P 2
2∆
(
λn
λ
)2
< 0.
This verifies Lemma 4. ✷
The level of IPR-protection of the North when the South chooses ωs = 0 is given by
Rn(ωn, ωs = 0) = 0. Since the second derivative of R(ω) with respect to ω reads
d2Rn(ωn, 0)
dω2n
= −
(
β
1− β
)2
P 2
4∆
< 0, (A.19)
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Rn(ωn, 0) is strictly concave in ωn. It also possesses two roots
ωan1 =
2(1− β)
β2P 2
[
((2− β)D − P )∆
λ
λn
+
√
∆
λ
λn
X(∆
λ
λn
)
]
,
ωan2 =
2(1− β)
β2P 2
[
((2− β)D − P )∆
λ
λn
−
√
∆
λ
λn
X(∆
λ
λn
)
]
,
where X(∆ λ
λn
) = 4∆ λ
λn
(1 − β)D(D − P ) + P 2∆ λ
λn
+ β2(Y P 2 +D2∆ λ
λn
) > 0. Only ωan1
is economically sensible. Hence we define the level of IPR-protection of the North when
the South provides no IPR-protection by ωan ≡ ω
a
n1. Using the same line of argument as
with regard to Lemma 4, we are now able to formulate:
Lemma 5
(i) ∀ ω > ωan2, Rn(ωn, 0) > (<) 0 ⇔ ωn < (>) ω
a
n.
(ii) dRn(ωn,0)
dωn
∣∣∣
ωn=ωan
< 0.
Further, we show
Lemma 6
ωan > 0 and ω
x
n > 0 at ∆
s
m if and only if
λn
λs
> D
D−P
.
Proof. The condition that ωxn > 0 and ω
a
n > 0 at ∆
s
m is equivalent to R
e
n(0) > 0 and
Rn(0, 0) > 0 at ∆
s
m according to Lemmata 4 and 5. Inserting ∆
s
m given in equation
(A.17) into Ren(0) > 0 and Rn(0, 0) > 0 yields
Ren(0) > 0 ⇔ Rn(0, 0) > 0 ⇔ −
βY P (λsD − λn(D − P ))
2λ(D − P )
> 0
⇔
λn
λs
>
D
D − P
.
✷
Let us now establish
Lemma 7
ωxn possesses a unique maximum at ∆c.
Proof. First we obtain from (A.13) that
lim
∆→0
ωxn =
λs
λn
Y
D − P
< 0 (A.20a)
lim
∆→0
∂ωxn
∂∆
= +∞. (A.20b)
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Using the implicit function theorem, the sign of
dωen
d∆
= −
∂Ren(ωn)
∂∆
dRen(ωn)
dωn
, ∆ > 0,
is identical to that of ∂R
e
n(ωn)
∂∆
because dR
e
n(ωn)
dωn
< 0 at ωn = ω
x
n due to Lemma 4 (ii).
∂Ren(ωn)
∂∆
= −
βPB
2(2− β)2
−
√
βP
βP (λsY − λnωn(D − P ))
8(2− β)2∆λ(D − P )
. (A.21)
According to (A.21), ∂R
e
n(ωn)
∂∆
is strictly increasing with ωn. Hence there exists a ωn,crit,
defined by ∂R
e
n(ωn)
∂∆
= 0, for which ∂R
e
n(ωn)
∂∆
> (<) 0 if and only if ωn > (<) ωn,crit. ωn,crit
can be written as
ωn,crit =
λs
λn
Y
D − P
+
λ
λn
2∆
βP
√
βPB.
This reveals that ωn,crit is increasing linearly with ∆ and that
lim
∆→0
ωn,crit = lim
∆→0
ωxn =
λs
λn
Y
D − P
< 0.
Considering (A.20b) and the strict concavity of ωxn, we can directly infer that there will be
a unique intersection of ωxn and ωn,crit at a ∆ > 0 which we call ∆c. Due to the definition
of ωn,crit, this intersection is at the maximum of ω
x
n in ∆. ✷
Using the same line of argument as in Lemma 7, it can be shown that
Lemma 8
ωan is strictly concave in ∆ and there exists a ∆crit > 0 where it possesses a unique
maximum.
The proof will be provided upon request. Now we are able to show the existence of ∆0n.
Lemma 9
There exists a ∆0n such that ω
e
n = 0 for all ∆ ≥ ∆
0
n.
To establish the existence of ∆0n, we have to distinguish between the cases where ∆
0
n > ∆
0
s
and ∆0n ≤ ∆
0
s. In the first case, existence of a ∆
0
n > ∆
0
s requires that ω
a
n ≤ 0 for all ∆
larger than a certain threshold value. Consider first the IPR-level in autarky ωan. Due to
the strong concavity of ωan and since
dωan
d∆
< 0 for all ∆ > ∆crit (see Lemma 8, there exists
a threshold of ∆ where ωan ≤ 0 for all ∆ larger than this threshold.
A threshold level ∆0n ≤ ∆
0
s requires that ω
x
n ≤ 0 for all ∆ larger than a certain threshold
value. Such a threshold value of ∆ exists since ωxn is strictly concave in ∆ and
∂ωxn
∂∆
< 0
for all ∆ < ∆c according to Lemma 7. ✷
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Finally we establish
Lemma 10
∆0n > ∆
0
s if and only if
λn
λs
> D
D−P
.
A necessary and sufficient condition for ∆0n > ∆
0
s is that ω
a
n > 0 at ∆
s
m. This condition
is sufficient as ∆0s is smaller than or equal to ∆
s
m.
59 The condition is necessary because
if ωan < 0 at ∆
s
m then ω
a
n < 0 for all ∆ ≥ ∆
s
m. Further we know from Lemma 6, that
ωxn < 0 at ∆
s
m if and only if ω
a
n < 0 at ∆
s
m. This implies that there exists a ∆ < ∆
s
m for
which ωxs > 0 and that ∆
0
s = ∆
s
m. Consequently, ω
a
n > 0 at ∆
s
m is necessary for ∆
0
n > ∆
0
s.
According to Lemma 6, ωan > 0 at ∆
s
m if and only if
λn
λs
> D
D−P
. ✷
Next we verify items (i)-(iii) of Proposition 3
(i): ωes is strictly declining for the following reason. Since
λn
λs
> D
D−P
holds by assumption,
ωxn > 0 at the point ∆
s
m. This implies that ω
x
s = ω
r
s(ω
x
n) is negative at ∆
s
m. Further, ω
x
s
must be smaller than or equal to ωrs(0) if ω
x
n ≥ 0. According to Lemma 2, ω
x
s is strictly
convex. It follows from (A.20a) that ωxs > 0 for some ∆ < ∆
s
m. This, together with
ωxs < 0 at ∆
s
m implies that ω
e
s possesses a unique root ∆
0 in the relevant interval [0,∆sm]
and is strictly decreasing for all ∆ < ∆0. Since
ωes =


ωˆrs(0), if ω
x
n ≤ 0,
ωˆxs , if ω
x
n ∈ (0, 1),
ωˆrs(1), if ω
x
n ≥ 1,
ωes is (weakly) decreasing and positive for all ∆ < ∆
0.
To verify that the equilibrium enforcement of the South takes the corner solution ωes = 0
for all ∆ larger then ∆0, we have to consider ωan which indicates the North’s best response
to ωs = 0. Only if ω
a
n > ω
s
n(0) for all ∆ ∈ (∆
0,∆sm), will the South choose ω
e
s = 0 for all
∆ ≥ ∆0. Since ωan = ω
x
n = ω
s
n(0) at ∆
0, ωan is strictly concave in ∆, and ω
a
n > 0 at ∆
s
m,
ωan does not intersect ω
s
n(0) in the interval ∆ ∈ (∆
0,∆sm).
(ii): As ωes = 0 for all ∆ > ∆
0, the North acts as if in autarky because in this case there
are no profit inflows from the South and, hence, neither are there additional incentives to
conduct R&D in the North. Accordingly the government in the North acts as if λs = 0
and λn = λ.
The inverted U-shape of ωen follows from the following line of argument. According to
the previously established lemmata, both ωxn and ω
a
n are strictly concave and follow an
59∆0s ≤ ∆
s
m follows from ω
e
s ≤ ω
r
s(0) because ωs is a strategic substitute to ωn and ωn ≥ 0 in
equilibrium.
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inverted U-shape in ∆. ωen combines ω
x
n for ∆ < ∆
0 and ωan for ∆ > ∆
0. ωxn and ω
a
n
intersect at ∆0 and ωxn > ω
a
n for ∆ > ∆
0 while ωxn < ω
a
n for ∆ < ∆
0. The strict concavity
of both ωxn and ω
a
n then implies that at the intersection
∂ωan
∂∆
< ∂ω
x
n
∂∆
. Now it follows directly
that ωen is concave and exhibits an inverted U-shaped form on the interval of ∆ where
ωen > 0.
(iii): According to Lemma 2, ωxn is strictly concave in ∆. Further, we have lim∆→0 ω
x
n < 0
according to (A.20a). From ωxn > 0 at ∆
s
m (Lemma 6), we infer that ω
x
n > 0 at ∆
0. ωxs is
strictly convex and strictly declining on [0,∆0]. Further, ωxs = 0 at ∆
0. As a consequence,
there is exactly one intersection ωxn and ω
x
s on [0,∆
0]. Denoting the value of ∆ at the
intersection by ∆x, we obtain directly that for all ∆ < ∆x, ωxs > ω
x
n and for all
∆x < ∆ ≤ ∆0, ωxs < ω
x
n.
✷
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium growth rate of both economies writes
g =
βP (λn
λ
ωxn +
λs
λ
ωxs )
2(1− β)∆
.
Inserting
ωxn =
1
β2P 2λn
[
Q1(∆) + 2
√
(2− β)2∆λ2Q2(∆)
]
(A.22)
and ωxs as given by (11) and differentiating with respect to ∆ yields
dg
d∆
=
−βZ
2∆
√
∆(β2ZP 2 +∆((3− β)2D2 − 4(3− 2β)DP + 2(2− β)P 2
< 0.
✷
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
First we show that ωxn increases with
λn
λs
and, thereafter, that ωxs decreases with
λn
λs
.
Finally, we verify that the growth rate is invariant with λn
λs
given ∆.
1. Let us consider Ren(ωn), which is derived by inserting ω
r
s(ωn) as given by (11) into
the first-order condition of the North (14). As shown in the first part of the proof
of Proposition 2, Ren(ωn) possesses two real roots, of which only the larger one is
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economically sensible and is denoted by ωxn. Using the implicit-function theorem,
we obtain
dωxn
dλn
λs
∣∣∣∣∣
λ
=
dωxn
dλn
∣∣∣∣
λ
= −
∂Ren(ωn)
∂λn
∣∣∣
λ
∂Ren(ωn)
∂ωn
.
Concerning the sign of the denominator, we can show that ∂R
e
n(ωn)
∂ωn
|ωn=ωxn < 0 by
verifying that Ren(ωn) is strictly concave.
60 Ren(ωn) can be written as
Ren(ωn) =
D − P
2
β
2− β
P
(
λn
λ
ωn − A1
)
+∆D +
βP
2
[
λn
λ
(Z + ωnD)− P
1− β
2− β
A1 − P
λn
λ
ωn
2− β
−
(
β
2− β
)2
P 2
4∆
(
λn
λ
ωn − A1
)2]
.
where A1 =
Z
D−P
λs
λ
+ 2∆
βP
. Taking the second derivative with respect to ωn, we obtain
∂2Ren(ωn)
∂ω2n
= −
(
β
2− β
)2
P 2
2∆
(
λn
λ
)2
< 0.
As a consequence of the denominator being negative, the sign of dω
x
n
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
is identical
to that of dR
e
n(ωn)
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
. For the derivative of Ren(ωn) with respect to λn given the total
market size λ, we can write
∂Ren(ωn)
∂λn
∣∣∣∣
λ
=
βP (Z + ωn(D − P ))
4∆(2− β)2λ2(D − P )2
[2∆λ(D − P )((3− β)(2− β)D
−(4− 3β)P ) + β2P 2(λsZ − λnωn(D − P ))
]
. (A.23)
Since Z + D − P > 0, it can be readily observed from (A.23) that dR
e
n(ωn)
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
> 0.
Hence, if we have an interior solution where ωen ∈ (0, 1), the North’s IPR-enforcement
level strictly increases with its relative effective market size.
2. We insert λs = λ−λn into (11) and take the derivative with respect to λn given the
total market size λ. We obtain
dωxs
dλn
∣∣∣∣
λ
= −
1− β
2− β
2∆λ
λ2s
−
ωn
2− β
λ
λ2s
−
λn
λs
1
2− β
dωxn
dλn
∣∣∣∣
λ
< 0 (A.24)
As we know from the first part of the proof that dω
x
n
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
> 0, it follows that dω
x
s
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
< 0.
This verifies that the South (at an interior solution) also increases IPR-enforcement
if its relative market size increases.
60This follows from the facts mentioned above: that Ren(ωn) possesses two real roots and ω
x
n is the
larger one of the two.
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3. Consider now the steady-state growth rate in equilibrium:
g =
βP (λnω
x
n + λsω
x
s )
2(1− β)λ∆
.
Inserting ωxn as given by (A.22), ω
x
s and substituting λs by λ−λn, we obtain for the
derivative with respect to λn given λ:
dg
dλn
∣∣∣
λ
= 0.
✷
A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
The proof first shows that there is a unique solution to the North’s optimization problem.
Then we show that the desired harmonized enforcement level ωhn is strictly concave in ∆
by verifying that the second derivative is negative. The derivative of ωhn with respect to ∆
is always positive if the condition given in Item (i) of Proposition 7 is satisfied. Otherwise
the derivative will change its sign for larger values of ∆ implying an inverted U-shaped
relation between ωhn and ∆. This verifies Item (ii) of Proposition 7. With respect to Item
(iii), we first show that ωhn increases (decreases) with its relative effective market size if
ωhn < (>)ω
h
s . Using the properties of ω
h
n and ω
h
s on the relevant interval of ∆, we show
that there exists a unique ∆¯ such that ωhn > (<)ω
h
s if and only if ∆ > (<)∆¯. This proves
Item (iii) of Proposition 7.
(1)
We show that there is a unique solution to the North’s optimization problem. In this first
step, we also establish some lemmata that characterize the properties of Rhn(ω
h
n) and the
optimal solution ωhn. These will be useful to verify Items (i) – (iii) of Proposition 7.
We start by establishing the following lemma.
Lemma 11
Rhn(ω
h
n) is a strictly concave function and strictly declining on R+.
Proof. Consider the function Rhn(ω
h
n) as given by (21). R
h
n(ω
h
n) is strictly concave because
the second derivative can be written as
∂2Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂(ωhn)
2
= −
βPλ
4(1− β)2∆λn
< 0. (A.25)
The first derivative, ∂R
h
n(ω
h
n)
∂ωhn
, reads
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ωhn
=
βP
2(1− β)
(D − P ) +
βP
2
(D +
λs
λn
P )−
EhβP
2∆λn(1− β)
.
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As the last term is positive, ∂R
h
n(ω
h
n)
∂ωhn
< 0 if the first two summands together are negative.
This is the case if
λs
λn
< −
D
P
2− β
1− β
+
1
1− β
. (A.26)
As stated in the main text, the sufficient condition for a maximum of the government’s
problem is
λs
λn
< −
2D
P
+ 1. (A.27)
Since 2−β
1−β
> 2 and 1
1−β
> 1 for all β ∈ (0, 1), the second-order condition of the govern-
ment’s problem, (A.27), is stronger than condition (A.26). That is, all values of λs
λn
that
satisfy the second-order condition (A.27) will also satisfy (A.26). Hence, for the relevant
parameter set satisfying condition (A.27), Rhn(ω
h
n) is strictly concave, it must be declining
with ωhn on R+. ✷
Rhn(ω
h
n) possesses the following roots.
ωhn1 =
2(1− β)
β2λnP 2
(
∆((1− β)(D +
λs
λn
P ) +D − P ) +
√
∆Q3(∆)
)
, (A.28)
ωhn2 =
2(1− β)
β2λnP 2
(
∆((1− β)(D +
λs
λn
P ) +D − P )−
√
∆Q3(∆)
)
,
where Q3(∆) = β
2 λ
λn
Y P 2 +∆
[
2β λ
λn
(D+ λs
λn
P )P + ((1− β)(D+ λs
λn
P ) +D− P )2
]
. Since
only real roots may possess economic meaning in our context, we restrict ourselves to the
case where Q3(∆) > 0. Then it follows that only ω
h
n1 may assume positive values while
ωhn2 is always negative. Consequently, there is a unique economically sensible solution
ωhn ≡ ω
h
n1.
The North’s desired harmonized IPR-level ωhn possesses the following properties.
Lemma 12
(a) ωhn is a strictly concave function in ∆.
(b) lim∆→0 ω
h
n = 0.
(c) lim∆→0
∂ωhn
∂∆
=∞.
Proof. (a) The second derivative of ωhn with respect to ∆ writes
∂2ωhn
∂∆2
= −
(1 − β)β2 λ
λn
Y 2P 2
2(∆Q3(∆))
3
2
< 0.
This verifies the concavity of ωhn.
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Item (b) can be observed directly in equation (A.28).
(c) The derivative of ωhn with respect to ∆ can be written as
∂ωhn
∂∆
=
2(1− β)
β2 λ
λn
P 2
[
(1− β)(D +
λs
λn
P ) +D − P +
Q4(∆)√
∆Q3(∆)
]
,
whereQ4(∆) = β
2 λ
λn
Y P 2−2∆(1−β−β λ
λn
)(D+ λs
λn
P )+D)P+P 2. Since lim∆→0∆Q3(∆) =
0, it depends on the sign of lim∆→0Q4(∆) whether the limit of
∂ωhn
∂∆
at ∆ = 0 will be plus
or minus infinity. We obtain c) as lim∆→0Q4(∆) > 0.
✷
(2)
Now we can show items (i) and (ii) of Proposition 7. Using the implicit function theorem,
we have
dωhn
d∆
= −
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂∆
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ωhn
.
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ωhn
is negative according to Lemma 11. Consequently, the sign of dω
h
n
d∆
is equal to that
of ∂R
h
n(ω
h
n)
∂∆
. We obtain
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂∆
= D +
λs
λn
P +
β3P 3(ωhn)
2
8(1− β)2∆2
λ
λn
.
Hence, dω
h
n
d∆
< 0 if and only if
Dλn + Pλs < −
β3P 3(ωhn)
2
8(1− β)2∆2
λ
λn
. (A.29)
The right hand side of (A.29) is clearly negative. Thus if Dλn + Pλs > 0, which is
equivalent to λn
λs
> −P
D
, condition (A.29) is not satisfied and we obtain dω
h
n
d∆
> 0. This
proves (i).
With respect to (ii), suppose that λn
λs
> −P
D
. Then (A.29) defines a critical value of
IPR-enforcement ωcn, for which
dωhn
d∆
> (<) 0 if and only if ωhn > (<)ω
c
n. The critical value
is
ωcn =
2∆(1− β)
βP
√
−
2(D + λs
λn
P )
βP
λ
λn
(A.30)
Equation (A.30) reveals that ωcn is a linear function of ∆ with a positive finite slope and
lim∆→0 ω
c
n = 0. Together with the properties of ω
h
n as given in Lemma 12, we can conclude
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that there exists a unique ∆m > 0 such that dω
h
n
d∆
> 0 for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆m) and dω
h
n
d∆ o
< 0 for
all ∆ > ∆m. This verifies claim (ii).
Now we turn to (iii). According to the implicit function theorem, we can write
dωhn
dλn
λs
= −
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂λn
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ωhn
.
Since ∂R
h
n(ω
h
n)
∂ωhn
< 0 (Lemma 11), the sign of dω
h
n
dλn
λs
is equal to the sign of ∂R
h
n(ω
h
n)
∂ λn
λs
as given by
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ λn
λs
= Rhs (ω
h
s ) ≡
(
1 +
E˜h
2∆
)
(D − P ) + β
P
2∆
(Y + ωhj (D − P )), (A.31)
which is equivalent to the South’s first-order condition in steady state (cf. footnote 21).
Again, ∂R
h
n(ω
h
n)
∂ λn
λs
= 0 defines a critical value of IPR-protection, ωc
′
n , such that
∂Rhn(ω
h
n)
∂ λn
λs
> (<) 0
if and only if ωhn < (>)ω
c′
n . Since (A.31) is identical to the first-order condition to the
South’s maximization problem, ωc
′
n is identical to ω
h
s . Further, we define ∆ as the level
of research productivity relative to total effective market size where ωhs = 0. ∆ can be
expressed as
∆ = −
βPY
2(D − P )
> 0.
Since ωhs is declining with ∆ (see (19)), ∆ > 0 implies that ω
h
s > 0 at ∆ = 0. It follows
that ωhn < ω
h
s for small values of ∆ according to the properties of ω
h
n as described in
Lemma 12. Since ωhn is strictly concave in ∆, a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of a ∆¯ such that ωhn < (>)ω
h
s for all ∆ < (>) ∆¯ is that ω
h
n > ω
h
s (= 0) at ∆.
By a similar line of argument as in the proof of Lemma 4, we can infer from Lemma 11
that ωhn > 0 at ∆ if and only if R
h
n(0) > 0 given ∆ = ∆. The latter can be written as
Rhn(0)|∆=∆ = −
βY P 2
2(D − P )
λ
λn
> 0.
This verifies that ωhn and ω
h
s possess exactly one intersection where ω
h
n, ω
h
s > 0. We denote
the value of ∆ at this intersection by ∆¯. It now follows directly that dω
h
n
dλn
< (>) 0 for all
∆ > (<) ∆¯. ✷
A.9 Proof of Proposition 8
The proof of Proposition 8 follows directly from the last part of the proof of Proposition
7, where we have shown that ωhn and ω
h
s possess a unique intersection where both ω
h
n and
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ωhs are greater than zero. ∆¯ is the level of ∆ at this intersection. It follows further from
the proof of Proposition 7 that ωhn < ω
h
s if ∆ < ∆¯ and ω
h
n > ω
h
s if ∆ > ∆¯. ✷
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